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Abstract: This article reassesses the trade–development nexus in international
economic law and provides the first examination of the approach to realize the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals through regional integration. It argues that the
emerging New Regional Economic Order in the multipolar system will fortify the
coalition of developing countries in structuring the legalization of pro-development
trade policy. For decades, the misconceived concept of special and differential
treatment has ignored the reality of the North–South Grand Bargain and disconnected
the World Trade Organization from its development objectives. The development crisis
of the Doha Round requires a feasible “Plan B” for the Global South.
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this article opens an inquiry
into the assertive role of developing countries that prompted the paradigm shift in Asia–
Pacific regionalism. The realist and dependency theories are utilized to decipher the
geopolitical complexity of the rapidly evolving South–South free trade agreements. As
a timely case study, the analysis is based on the creation of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Economic Community and its implications for economic powers such as
the United States and China. It provides an account of the bloc’s services trade-oriented
development policy under the balance of power strategy. Finally, this article offers
regulatory reform proposals on how to integrate development assistance and remove
trade barriers. Transnational legal harmonization and human rights protection in line
with international labor principles are also indispensable. Such reforms will strengthen
the best practices for global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade–development
connection in the multilateral trading system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The convergence of economic liberalization and development policy
has formed the cornerstone of multilateral trade negotiations and
international economic law for decades. Geopolitical challenges remain
when it comes to reconciling the mercantilist concept of enhancing market
access with the principle of redistributive justice that demands preferential
treatment.1 More fundamentally, the legalization of the trade–development
nexus reflects the global North–South conflicts that underpin divergent
national interests between developed and developing countries.2
Unanimously adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2015, the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development seeks to transform such long-standing
conflicts to cooperation.3 With the aim to eradicate poverty and reinforce
inclusive economic growth, the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
conceive of international trade as the essential development apparatus.4 The
SDGs mandated the revitalization of development by completing the
negotiations of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).5
Yet, states’ irreconcilable stances on liberalizing restrictions on agriculture,
non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and services trade led the Doha
Round talks to an unresolved standstill.6 From Seattle to Nairobi, the WTO
Ministerial Conferences have generated more frustrations than
achievements.7 The fate of the Doha Round hinges on whether it can achieve
1 For mercantilist and distributive justice concepts in international trade, see J. Michael Finger, The
Uruguay Round North-South Bargain: Will the WTO Get over It?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 301, 303–05 (Daniel L. M.
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Chantal Thomas, The Death of Doha? Forensics of
Democratic Governance, Distributive Justice, and Development in the WTO, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS 185, 185–205 (Chios Carmody et al.
eds., 2014).
2 See Deniz Altınbaş, South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement?, in THE RISE OF
THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY
29, 29 n.1 (Justin Dargin ed., 2013) (explaining the North-South divide in global politics).
3 UN Adopts New Global Goals, Charting Sustainable Development for People and Planet by 2030,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51968#.VkLue
7crLrc. The Sustainable Development Goals that took effect January 1, 2016 were built upon Millennium
Development Goals that governed the development agenda from 2000 to 2015. G.A. A/69/L.85 Draft
Outcome Document of the United Nations Summit for the Adoption of the Post-2105 Development
Agenda, at 3–7 (Aug. 12, 2015).
4 G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sept.
25, 2015) [hereinafter Sustainable Development Goals (2015)], Goals 1 & 8.
5 Id. at Goal 17.
6 Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J.
573, 577–83 (2010); ICTSD Reporting, LDC Group Outlines Priorities Ahead of WTO MC10, ICTSD
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/ldc-group-outlines-prioritiesahead-of-wto-mc10.
7 For the implications of the trade-development disconnect in the Doha Round, see Tomer Broude,
The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational
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the aspirational commitment to development in tandem with liberalizing
trade under the WTO and free trade agreements (FTAs).8
To understand the role of trade politics in shaping today’s global
economic governance, it is pivotal to trace back to the origin of the North–
South clash in the UN and the WTO. The WTO’s predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Bretton Woods Institutions
were established in the 1940s and provided the framework that governed
postwar economic order.9 The most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and
national treatment of the GATT crystalized the guiding principles for
legalism of trade rulemaking.10 Developing countries’ demands that their
development needs be met by making exceptions to the West-dominated
mechanism were predominantly ignored in the 1940s.11
The South decided to shift the battle to the UN. The proliferation of
newly independent states in the postcolonial era bolstered developing
countries’ political power to divert the GATT’s attention to “special and
differential treatment” (SDT) for the South.12 The culmination of the
movement was the 1974 UN declaration calling for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO).13 The NIEO principles symbolize the Westphalian
concept and affirmative action in international economic law.14 On the one
hand, the South asked for recognition of its sovereignty over trade policy; on
the other hand, it requested an increase in financial and technological
assistance from the North.15
The NIEO soon failed because of the unified trans-Atlantic alliance visà-vis the erosion of the South’s political solidarity due to the disparate

Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 246–61 (2007); Meredith Kolsky Lewis, WTO
Winners and Losers: The Trade and Development Disconnect, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 165, 168–77 (2008);
Arun S, Stalemate Continues at WTO Meet in Nairobi, HINDU, (Dec. 20, 2015),
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/stalemate-continues-at-wto-meet-in-nairobi/article
8005357.ece.
8 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration], at paras. 1–6.
9 Bretton Woods Institutions refer to monetary institutions, including the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT 1994), arts. I & III.
11 See, e.g., Nicholas Lamp, The “Development” Discourse in International Trade Lawmaking,
QUEEN’S UNIV. FACULTY OF L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2015-057, 2015, at 8–10 (indicating the
US negotiators’ negative perception of “development” in the 1940s).
12 Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When, and
How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 147, 148–49 (Simon J.
Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006).
13 G.A. Res. S-6/3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) (May 1, 1974).
14 See id. art. 4 (stressing the countries’ “full permanent sovereignty”); ROBERT E. HUDEC,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 101–02 (1987) (explaining developing countries’
request to rectify global economic inequalities and their emphasis on equality).
15 G.A. Res. S-6/3201, supra note 13, art. 4.
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economic development of different nations and the debt crisis in the 1990s.16
The rising Washington Consensus, which imposed neoliberal liberalization
reform as a prerequisite for aid assistance from the Bretton Woods
Institutions, further weakened the NIEO’s momentum.17 Arguably, the
legacy of the NIEO resulted in the subsequent codification of SDT provisions
during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds.18 To “pay back” the developing
countries for their sacrifice under the WTO’s single undertaking modality,
the current Doha Development Agenda committed to making SDT “precise,
effective and operational.”19 Nonetheless, the realpolitik of WTO
negotiations has rendered this promise unpromising.
Contrary to the South’s expectations, the 148 current SDT provisions of
the WTO agreements contain predominantly “best endeavor” language and
are rarely enforced as binding obligations in WTO disputes.20 The perceived
failure to meet the development commitments inevitably undermines the
legitimacy of the WTO and the implementation of the SDGs. To some extent,
such failure is due to developing countries’ erroneous presumption that SDT
provisions would eliminate or at least reduce pressure from free trade and
thus benefit development policy. In essence, the policy space created under
SDT arrangements hinders developing countries’ meaningful participation in
multilateral trade negotiations.21 Without the “Grand Bargain” negotiations
between the North and South, the developing nations’ restricted trade gains
simply nullify the economic goal of pro-poor development and the human
rights-oriented “right to development.”22
Facing the global development crisis of the Doha Round and
16 Nils Gilman, The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction, 6 HUMANITY 1, 8 (2015);
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 67–68 (2014),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdr2014_en.pdf.
17 SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal
Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
18 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149–52; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 72; The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last
visited August 13, 2017).
19 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, para. 44.
20 Committee on Trade and Development Special Session, Note by Secretariat: Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. TN/CTD/W/33, at 3–
5 (June 8, 2010); Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions under
the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 14–30 (George A. Bermann &
Petro C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
21 Michael Trebilcock, Between Theories of Trade and Development: The Future of the World
Trading System 3 (Univ. of Toronto L. Working Paper No. 2014-10, 2014); Paul Collier, Why the WTO
is Deadlocked: And What Can Be Done About It?, 29 WORLD ECON. 1423, 1434 (2006).
22 See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future
Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROBERT E. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 285–89 (illustrating the “Grand Bargain” negotiations); G.A. Res.
41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development, arts. 2–3 (Dec. 4, 1986) (mandating the duty to
formulate development policies).
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international economic law, this article provides the first examination of how
the SDGs can be achieved through regional integration. It argues that the
emerging New Regional Economic Order (NREO) in multipolar governance
will strengthen the ability of the coalition of developing countries to reinforce
the legalization of trade–development policy.23 The article thus shifts the
conventional trade–development debate centered on the WTO’s SDT to a
related but new dimension: the development role of the South in an age of
global regionalism. Distinct from the NIEO, the NREO, derived from the
power shifts to the Asia–Pacific, does not aspire to challenge the normative
foundation of WTO principles. Rather, it opens an inquiry into how
developing countries utilize an assertive balance-of-power strategy to alter
the embedded hub-and-spoke architecture for development purposes.24
Geopolitical changes have propelled the paradigm shift from the NIEO
and the NREO in international economic law and trade politics. First, the
NREO aligns with the global movement from the United States-centric
“unipolar moment” to multipolar trade governance.25 The United States’
hegemonic economic power has declined. Asia’s emerging powers, including
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have
galvanized the Obama Administration’s “Pacific Century” Agenda.26 The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) formed part of the “pivot to Asia” strategy,
despite the pact’s unpredictable future due to the Trump Administration’s
changing stance.27
23 Some authors used the term, “New Regional Economic Order.” Nevertheless, none of them
substantiate the claim or explain the nexus between development dimensions and contemporary AsiaPacific regionalism. See, e.g., Adriano R. Garcia, Toward a New Regional Economic Order in Asia and
the Pacific, X J. PHIL. DEV. 45, 45–53 (1983); Greg Fry, ‘Pooled Regional Governance’ in the Island
Pacific: Lessons from History, in PACIFIC ISLAND REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 89, 92
(Satish Chand ed., 2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING
IN THE NEW ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013).
24 See Richard Baldwin, Preferential Trading Arrangements, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 632, 640–41 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012) (discussing regionalism
and hub-and-spoke bilateralism).
25 For the unipolar and multipolar political analyses, see generally Charles Krauthammer, see The
Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1992); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International
Law: Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015). For recent changes
to international investment law in the Asia-Pacific, see Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of
International Investment Law—Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment
in the Asia-Pacific Region, 47 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2015).
26 Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POL’Y 56, 60–61 (2011).
27 Id. at 62. The 12-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was finalized in October 2015. Jane
Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0;
David Nakamura, Obama Turns on Personal Appeal While Trying to Bolster His Pivot to Asia, WASH.
POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-toasia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html; Donald J. Trump, Presidential
Memorandum Regarding Withdrawl of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
and Agreement, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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Second, compared with the economic slowdown in the United States
and European Union (EU), the evolution of South–South trade cooperation
in Asia has ascended to a new level and strengthened the multipolar moment
in the international economic order. The ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are
the most ambitious initiatives currently launched by developing countries.
As innovative models for South–South FTAs, the AEC and the RCEP
incorporate major Asia–Pacific powers and half of the world’s population.28
These blocs consolidate currently fragmented FTAs in Asia–Pacific
regionalism. Lastly, regional developing countries, including least developed
countries (LDCs), have engaged in the Grand Bargain, expediting the shift
from an import substitution policy to an export-oriented growth model.
Regardless of different national strategies, the NREO’s pro-development
liberalization has prompted an emerging realization among the developing
countries that they should transform from the North–South conflicts to
North–South collaboration, in line with the SDGs.
Built upon Jagdish Bhagwati’s commentary on First and Second
Regionalism, this article answers the question of the trade–development
paradigm in Third Regionalism with both theoretical and substantive
claims.29 Theoretically, I will apply realist and dependency theories to
decipher the NREO and advance the understanding of South–South FTAs,
which the existing literature barely examines. While realism addresses the
transition from the pessimistic political rivalry to cooperation based on
mutual interests, the new dependency theory sheds light on the economic
transformation of neocolonial states.30
Substantively, I will focus on the legal framework of ASEAN’s trade
office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific.
28 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) expects to consolidate the existing
five free trade agreements (FTAs) that Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concluded with
China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. The ASEAN Community, including the AEAN
Economic Community (AEC), was established in 2015 and the RCEP will be concluded in 2016. Shujiro
Urata, Constructing and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian
Perspective 3–13 (ADBI Working Paper No. 449, 2013); Association of Southeast Asian Nations
[ASEAN], Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community (Nov. 22, 2015),
http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/KL-Declaration-on-Establishment-of-ASEAN
-Community-2015.pdf, [hereinafter Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2015)]; Association of Southeast Asian
Nations [ASEAN], Joint Statement on the RCEP Negotiations (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/RCEP-Leaders-Joint-Statement_22-Nov-2015_
FINAL.pdf.
29 Bhagwati explains the first two waves of regionalism beginning in the 1960s and 1980s,
respectively. Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 WORLD ECON. 535, 538–42
(1992). I propose that “Third Regionalism” from the 2000s to the present reflects the rapid development
of Asia–Pacific regionalism, including the emergence of mega FTAs.
30 See generally Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, 19 INT’ L
SECURITY 50, 50–53 (1995); Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 AM. ECON. REV.
231, 231–33 (1970).
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liberalization as a timely case study for the NREO. As part of the Global
South, Southeast Asia has become a political hot spot due to the South China
Sea disputes and Myanmar’s democratization.31 The proliferation of FTAs is
also integral to this geopolitical configuration. From a development
perspective, the liberalization of services trade significantly reduces poverty
and helps avoid the “middle income trap.”32 However, it is politically
challenging to liberalize trade in services in the WTO and FTA arenas
because of behind-the-border barriers. This article demonstrates how
ASEAN states have incrementally liberalized the service sector for
development goals on the basis of an “interlocked mechanism” between
internal and external, region-based FTAs.33 As part of the South–South
approach to implement the SDGs, the ASEAN experience provides
developing countries a feasible “Plan B” by which to fortify the trade–
development connection amid the Doha Round impasse.
This article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part II provides
the historical and geopolitical context of North–South conflicts and trade–
development debates in international economic law. It reassesses the
misconception of SDT that led to the disconnect between the Doha Round
negotiations and the SDGs. Based on the corollaries of realist and decency
theories, it argues that the NREO, which emerged in the context of Third
Regionalism, revitalizes pro-development trade liberalization for developing
countries. Part III substantiates the paradigm shift by analyzing new trends
among South–South FTAs in Asia–Pacific regionalism and focusing on the
creation of the AEC as a key case study. It explains the evolution of
ASEAN’s legal structure that galvanizes regional economic integration
across diverse countries and examines the rationale for the services tradeoriented policy as a development model.
Part IV details the first efforts to provide a roadmap for realizing the
SDGs through the legalization of trade–development policy in regional
integration and highlights regulatory reform proposals for the post-2015
agenda. To utilize the assertive balance of power strategy, ASEAN FTAs
should operationalize multilateral development assistance and remove
31 The South China Sea disputes are not only between ASEAN claimant states and China but also
involve conflicting national interests between the United States and China. E.g., James R. Holmes,
China’s Monroe Doctrine, DIPLOMAT (June 22, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-monroedoctrine/. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party recently won the presidential election in Myanmar. Jonah Fisher,
Myanmar Election: Suu Kyi’s NLD Wins Landslide Victory, BBC (Nov. 13, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34805806.
32 ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, ASEAN INTEGRATION MONITORING REPORT 93
(2013), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/915081468234873037/pdf/839140WP0P14480Box
0382116B00PUBLIC0.pdf; ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, ASEAN SERVICES
INTEGRATION REPORT 1–2 (2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/759841468178459585/
pdf/100637-Revised-WP-PUBLIC-Box393257B-ASEAN-Report-web.pdf.
33 In my view, the “interlocked mechanism” refers to how the liberalization effects of ASEAN’s
internal and external FTAs (ASEAN+1 FTAs) are mutually reinforcing.
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domestic barriers to services trade. Essential actions also include the
transnational legal harmonization on mutual recognition and immigration
regulations and the legalization of human rights that incorporate international
labor principles. Finally, the conclusion draws together these theoretical and
substantive arguments and offers legal and policy advice for reinvigorating
the trade–development nexus at the global stage.
II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TRADE–
DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
The trade–development nexus has been acutely contested since the
inception of the Bretton Woods system. This issue remains at the core of
multilateral trade negotiations and implicates the fundamental differences in
national interests between developed and developing countries. Before
proceeding to the analysis of present challenges to global regionalism, it is
vital to establish the theoretical framework for the trade–development
debates in the context of North–South conflicts in international economic
law. This article does so by reassessing the WTO’s SDT provisions in tandem
with its alleged development goals and then explaining geopolitical
dynamics under realist and dependency theories.
A. Unrealistic Promises in the Multilateral Trading System
The SDGs adopted in 2015 established post-2015 UN targets for
development on the basis of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The SDGs’ mandated the implementation of development goals through the
Doha Round, which underscores the WTO’s development agenda.34
However, the meaning and implementation of development through the
WTO have been controversial, as the WTO does not intend to be a
development organization. As an institution created for trade liberalization,
the concept of development in the WTO discourse is often confined to special
and differential treatment. Politically oriented SDT measures constitute an
excuse for noncompliance with WTO principles and contravene the
mercantilist premise of trade liberalization.
1. The Misconceived Concept of Special and Differential Treatment
The misconceived notion of SDT has led to unrealistic development
promises in multilateral trade negotiations. Structuring a sustainable trade–
development nexus requires a holistic understanding of development in the
historical and geopolitical context. In contrast with the quantitative concept
of trade, the multifaceted definition of development has been a subject of rife
34

Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 17.
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debate. Various postwar theorists understood development as
industrialization, modernization, or economic growth.35 Since the 1980s, the
human rights approach to development has been gathering momentum.36
Following the universal movement for the “right to development” and
“sustainable development,” Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s Development as
Freedom laid the new groundwork for development.37 Sen’s capability
approach explains development as progress for removing “unfreedoms that
leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their
reasoned agency.”38 This perception expanded the prevailing view of
development from the parochial definition of economic performance such as
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to multiple factors that influence
development.39 Sen’s theoretical framework contributed to the creation of
measurable development parameters in the UN Human Development Index
and the MDGs.40
To eliminate what Sen called “unfreedoms,” the trade–development
linkage concerns the implementation of development through international
trade that maximizes economic growth and reduces poverty. From a broader
perspective, the urge for development in the multilateral trading system seeks
to compromise the North–South conflicts in international economic law.
SDT provisions that accord developing countries proportional equality
represent the political compromise on such conflicts. In the GATT era, the
creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) symbolized the collective power of the South in shaping trade
norms dominated by developed nations.41 With the support of the developing
countries known as the “Group of 77” (G77), Raúl Prebisch, the UNCTAD’s
secretary general, pushed for the NIEO movement that demanded a “just and

35 See
JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, DEVELOPMENT THEORY: DECONSTRUCTIONS/
RECONSTRUCTIONS 5–8 (2d ed. 2010) (detailing theories and meanings of development from the 1800s
to 2000).
36 Paul J. Nelson, At the Nexus of Human Rights and Development: New Methods and Strategies of
Global NGOs, 31: 12 WORLD DEV. 2013, 2014–15 (2003); ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 25–26.
37 See generally Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 22; Report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (1987); Human Rights Approaches
to Sustainable Development, NGLS Roundup 90 (2002), at 1–2; AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM (1999).
38 SEN, supra note 37, at xii.
39 See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6:2 J. HUMAN DEV. 151, 153–54 (2005)
(discussing the capability approach); Faizel Ismail, Mainstreaming Economic Development in the Trading
System, ECON. DEV. & MULTILATERAL TRADING COOPERATION 213, 214 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard
M. Hoekman eds., 2016) (explaining Sen’s definition of development).
40 UNDP, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 16–28 (2010),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf.
41 See A Brief History of UNCTAD, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/About%20UNCTAD/A-Brief-History-of-UNCTAD.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) (“The first
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was held in Geneva in 1964.”).
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equitable” economic order.42
In essence, the South demanded absolute sovereignty and requested
justified exceptions to principal trade norms, including the MFN principle.
The UNCTAD did contribute to the enactment of “Part IV: Trade and
Development” of the GATT in 1965.43 As a paramount SDT doctrine, the
nonreciprocity principle requires developed countries not to “expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them” in trade negotiations with lessdeveloped countries.44 The other landmark decision to codify SDT rights was
the GATT’s adoption of the 1979 Enabling Clause that provided for
preferential market access.45 This decision permanently authorized members
to grant developing countries preferential treatment under the generalized
system of preferences (GSP) schemes.46
Notwithstanding the UNCTAD achievements in advancing the agenda
of the South, the NIEO movement waned as a result of the G77’s diverging
economic interests and the Thatcher–Reagan alliance’s refusal to accede to
the NIEO demands.47 The NIEO gave way to the neoliberal Washington
Consensus that imposed free market reform on developing countries.48 The
Uruguay Round, which established the WTO, sharply diverted from previous
negotiations by adopting the “take it or leave it” modality, known as the
single undertaking approach. Absent bargaining power, developing countries
were compelled under multiple WTO agreements to assume daunting
obligations in various areas ranging from services to intellectual property.
The implementation problem, which resulted in a strong sense of betrayal,
could not be overcome by additional SDT provisions that allowed technical
assistance and longer transition periods.49
42 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; Gilman, supra note 16, at 3–5; Declaration on the
Establishment of a NIEO, supra note 13, arts. 4(j) & 5.
43 Keck & Low, supra note 12, at 149; ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 70.
44 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (GATT 1994), art. XXXVI:8.
45 Differential and More Favorable Treatment of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979 [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. Contracting parties of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971
decision that granted a ten-year waiver allowing generalized system of preferences (GSP) to depart from
GATT norms. Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971.
46 See generally Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The Law and
Economics of GSP, 4:1 WORLD TRADE REV. 41, 41–43 (2005).
47 Trade and Development Report (2014), at 67–68; JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 238 (4th ed. 2014).
48 The neoliberal package of the Washington Consensus includes ten points such as the liberalization
of trade and foreign direct investment. John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus,
THE WASH. CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16–17 (Narcís
Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008).
49 See Don McRae, Developing Countries and ‘The Future of the WTO, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603, 603
(2005) (“The Uruguay Round is often portrayed as a betrayal.”); J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler,
Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 24:4 WORLD ECON. 511,
514 (2000) (stating the South has “taken on bound commitments to implement in exchange for unbound
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2. The WTO–Sustainable Development Goals Disconnect
The trade–development convergence is presumed to have entered a new
stage during the Doha Round. However, the SDT-focused agenda
disconnected the WTO from the SDGs. Economically, the Doha
Development Agenda was expected to rectify the unfairness of the Uruguay
Round and facilitate the conclusion of current negotiations. Politically, after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, fostering development and eliminating
poverty were perceived to be effective responses for fighting extremism.50
Moreover, the UN has constantly stressed the WTO’s role in realizing the
MDGs and SDGs.51
Given the proliferating SDT measures, the central question is whether
Doha development targets can be achieved. The answer is in the negative.
First, WTO development goals remain unachievable promises as a result of
the mismatch of expectations. The nonreciprocity principle ignores political
reality and ultimately undermines developing countries’ participation in
multilateral trade negotiations. Without the Grand Bargain, the South only
garnered limited market access to developed markets and thus their exportled growth is essentially restricted.52
Second, GSP preferences are often eroded by economic and political
considerations. In theory, the Enabling Clause provides a deviation from the
MFN principle.53 This fundamental issue was raised in EC-Tariff
Preferences, in which India challenged the European GSP scheme.54 The
Enabling Clause merely stipulates that donor countries “may” grant
preferential treatment to developing countries, meaning it imposes “no legal
obligation” for providing the GSP.55 Furthermore, GSP benefits may
unilaterally differ in order to “respond positively” to developing countries’
development needs, and such needs are subject to the sole discretion of the
developed countries.56 In practice, the U.S. and EU GSP systems have
excluded eligible countries that crossed economic benchmarks under the
graduation method and restricted those countries’ market access, owing to
commitments of assistance”); Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman, supra note 17, at 8–10 (discussing
the emergence of new special and differential treatment (SDT) in the Uruguay Round).
50 Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45:1
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–9 (2009); Cho, supra note 6, at 574.
51 G.A. Res. 55/2, Millenium Declaration, at 8–9 (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Millenium
Development Goals (2000)]; Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 17.
52 See generally Ostry, supra note 22, at 285–89; HUDEC, supra note 14, at 179–85.
53 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, para. 1, L/4903 GATT BISD (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
54 Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, adopted Apr. 20, 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report
WT/DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III [EC – Tariff Preferences], at 1009.
55 Id. at para. 7.38.
56 Id. at para. 165; Grossman & Sykes, supra note 46, at 51–52.
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domestic protectionist demands.57
Third, Uruguay Round-created SDT measures suffer from inherent
weaknesses in their design. These measures predominantly neglect the link
between countries’ technical assistance needs and their capacity to
implement WTO obligations.58 The transition periods under WTO
agreements are also arbitrarily determined.59 Most technical assistance
projects increase awareness of WTO law by offering educational courses, but
fail to advise WTO members how to conduct trade reform, which requires
knowledge beyond WTO rules.
Finally, most SDT provisions encourage developed countries to “give
every effort” or “particular attention” to the needs of developing countries.60
Such hortatory obligations are rarely enforced in WTO disputes. For
example, in China-Raw Materials, China invoked the development argument
in justifying its export constraints on raw materials such as bauxite and zinc.61
The legal basis on which Beijing relied was Article XXXVI:5, one of the
trade and development provisions in Part IV of the GATT.62 Nevertheless,
the panel rejected the argument, explaining that Article XXXVI:5 does not
assist in the interpretation of Article XI and Article XX(g).63
The rare incidences in which an SDT has been recognized relate only to
nonsubstantive issues. In Indonesia-Autos, the arbitrator noted the “interests
of developing country Members” requirement under Article 21.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding.64 The “reasonable period of time” for
57 For the explanations of the US and European Union (EU) GSP schemes, see Caf Dowlah, Trade
Preferences and Economic Growth: An Assessment of the U.S. GSP Schemes in the Context of Least
Developed Countries, in LAW AND DEV. PERSPECTIVE ON INT. TRADE LAW 334, 337–50 (Yong-Shik Lee
et al. eds., 2011); Grossman & Sykes, supra note 46, at 44–47.
58 The only exception is Section II of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation (2014). See Azevêdo
Launches New WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility to Deliver Support to LDCs and Developing
Countries, WTO (July 22, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/fac_22jul14_e.htm
(“For the first time in WTO history, the requirement to implement the Agreement was directly linked to
the capacity of the country to do so.”).
59 For instance, longer transition periods were granted to developing countries under the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. World Trade Report 2014 – Trade
and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO (2014) [hereinafter World Trade Report
(2014)], at 194–95.
60 E.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), art. XXXVII:3(a) & the TBT
Agreement (1995), art. 12.2. Among the 148 SDT provisions in WTO agreements, the GATT and the
TBT Agreement include most SDT provisions. Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions, supra note 20, at 5.
61 Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
WT/DS394/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R, Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R, Add.1 and Corr.1,
adopted Feb. 22, 2012, as modified by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R /
WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, at 3501, para. 7.275-404.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry –
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Indonesia to implement the WTO decision was therefore extended by six
months.65 To the dismay of developing countries, it is impractical to
transform the promises of the Doha Ministerial Declaration to operationalize
SDT provisions into making them mandatory.66 The far-reaching
redistributive transformation of according all SDT provisions binding
authority will damage the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system
that underpins the rule-based trading system.
B. Power Shifts in the Age of Global Regionalism
The unrealistic promises of development in the Doha Round are the
result of the SDT-centered approach. This flawed approach, underpinned by
an erroneous assumption of developing countries that SDT provisions are
enforced, is politically correct but unrealistic in multilateral trade
negotiations. The Doha Round deadlock, entrenched by agriculture and
NAMA issues, has crippled the chances of realizing the SDGs through the
WTO. At this juncture, a “Plan B” for accomplishing development goals is
becoming an urgent global matter. Against this background, I argue that the
emerging NREO serves as a feasible alternative for strengthening prodevelopment trade policy. Based on realist and dependency theories, the
contemporary South–South cooperation in Asia–Pacific regionalism
signifies a paradigm shift in the trade–development nexus. The legal
experiments, intertwined with geopolitical complexities, provide valuable
lessons for the Global South such as Africa and Latin America.
1. Geopolitical Dimensions in the Doha Round
This article thus shifts the traditional trade–development debate to a
new dimension related to the role of developing countries in global
regionalism. Traditionally, developing countries have favored
multilateralism, as regionalism strengthens the power of the developed
nations due to their “divide and conquer” strategy in bilateral negotiations.
The NREO is changing the paradigm. Sharing the aspiration of the NIEO,
the NREO fortifies the collective power of developing countries. However,
distinct from the NIEO, the NREO does not challenge the normative
principles of trade norms by requesting SDT exceptions. Instead, the NREO
pursues development goals through deep integration in FTAs and
reconstructs the neo-colonial dependency of the South on the North.
Bhagwati coined the term “First Regionalism” in reference to the

Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, WT/DS54/15, WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12,
Dec. 7, 1998, DSR 1998:IX, at 4029, paras. 23–24.
65 Id. at para. 25.
66 See generally Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, at para. 44.
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proliferation of FTAs in the 1960s and explained their collapse as a result of
the nations’ having unduly placed political considerations ahead of trade
liberalization.67 In “Second Regionalism” in the 1980s, Bhagwati observed
the relative success of the EU’s single market and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because of their strong economic motivations.68
In my view, the NREO has surfaced in “Third Regionalism,” which has
coincided with the Doha Round since the 2000s.69 The five-fold growth of
trade pacts in the past two decades leading to 406 FTAs in 2015 demonstrates
the significance of global regionalism.70 Third Regionalism encompasses
distinct characteristics. Representing 75% of FTAs worldwide, the FTAs
between developing countries (South–South FTAs) have substantially
outpaced the agreements between developed countries and developing
countries (North–South FTAs).71
In contrast with the first two waves of regionalism, almost 80% of
South–South FTAs expedite liberalization through WTO-plus components in
the absence of the North’s political pressure.72 Also notably, the mega FTAs
that focus on the Asia–Pacific region are becoming a game changer in
international economic law.73 By solving the balkanization of bilateral FTAs,
the mega FTAs have established new global norms and rendered the decline
of the WTO in political discourse.
Structural geopolitical transitions led to the NREO, which marks the
feature of Third Regionalism. Emerging Asian regionalism transformed the
world to multipolar economic governance.74 Following FTAs with Singapore
and Australia, the “pivot to Asia” policy reinforced the United States’
67 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 538–39. For the elaboration on the First Regionalism, refer to
Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on
Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 426–57 (2001).
68 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 540–42. Other examples in the Asia-Pacific include ASEAN Free
Trade Area and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report
2011, The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (2011) [hereinafter
World Trade Report (2011)], at 52–53.
69 Again, what I called “Third Regionalism” refers to the development of Asia-Pacific FTAs from
the 2000s to the present.
70 The number of FTAs increased from approximately 50 in the 1990s to more than 250 in 2010.
World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 55; WTO Secretariat, Free Trade Agreements, Facts &
Figures, Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World, 1948–2015, https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
71 South-South FTAs represented only 20% of FTAs in the 1970s and North-North FTAs currently
represent barely 10%. World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 55–56.
72 See Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism 8–9 (ADBI
Working Paper Series, No. 431, 2013) (concluding that 77% of surveyed Asian FTAs are WTO-plus,
including some or all Singapore issues).
73 In addition to Asia-Pacific focused mega FTAs, including the TPP and the RCEP, the US and the
EU are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
74 For the development of Asian regionalism, see generally Asian Development Bank, Emerging
Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity (2008).
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rebalance towards the economic power of the Asia–Pacific by concluding its
FTA with Korea and the TPP.75 The EU, which formed a trans-Atlantic
alliance for global trade, also followed the trend by signing FTAs with Asian
partners.76 Consequently, Washington and Brussels moved from their
antagonistic stance on the NIEO to a more receptive posture of the emerging
NREO.77
In the new multipolar structure, developing countries have maneuvered
a balance of power policy by augmenting their collective power through a
new hub-and-spoke system. South–South cooperation consolidates the bloc
by cementing internal and external FTAs, mutually reinforcing their levels
of trade liberalization. The notion of “ASEAN centrality” exemplifies the
convergence of the inward economic integration and outward agreements
with regional powers such as China, Japan, and India.78 Moreover, divergent
from their pessimistic requests focusing on SDT in the WTO, selected
developing countries, including LDCs, have engaged in the market accessbased Grand Bargain and benefited from South-centered regionalism. The
impressive poverty reduction of Cambodia and Vietnam epitomizes the
resultant trade-led growth.79 The elevation of ASEAN’s aggregated
economic power, in turn, reinforces the blocs’ bargaining capacity with the
North in global negotiations.
2. Realist and Dependency Theories
To respond to these contemporary challenges to international economic
law, I offer theoretical explanations for the trade–development nexus in the
NREO. Political theorists have conventionally stressed the development
dimensions of North–South trade.80 This research enriches the existing
75 See generally WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 1–8 (2014); Shihoko
Goto, South Korea and the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia, Apr. 3, 2013,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/south-korea-and-the-us-pivot-to-asia (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
76 The EU concluded FTAs with South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. European Commission, Trade
for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015), at 31–32.
77 See Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Relations (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/11/21/fact-sheet-us-asean-relations (“The United States supports ASEAN’s central role in
many of the region’s key institutions and works closely with ASEAN to strengthen Asia’s regional
architecture.”).
78 See Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (2012) (“Negotiations for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN Centrality in the emerging
regional economic architecture and the interests of ASEAN’s FTA Partners . . . .”). The RCEP will
materialize ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives. Urata, supra note 28, at 1–9.
79 OECD, Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013 – With Perspectives on China and India:
Narrowing Development Gaps (2013), at 246–48; Sok Siphana, Mainstreaming Trade for Poverty
Alleviation: A Cambodian Experience, 2 DEV. OUTREACH 7, 8–9 (2003).
80 Trade-development debates on North-South trade, which focuses on the relations between the EU
and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, will be discussed below.
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literature by examining the latest development of South–South trade.81 The
realist and dependency theories will be utilized to explain the comparison
between the NREO, which prompts South–South cooperation, and the NIEO,
which hinges on North–South conflicts.
Represented by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, realism is one of
the oldest theories of political science.82 Realists define the international
system as an anarchy that makes self-help essential for the survival of the
countries.83 As rational actors, states pursue their power according to their
national interests in the hegemonic world.84 Realism also influences
mercantilism in international political economy by perceiving global trade as
a zero-sum game that compels nations to maximize their economic benefits.85
The dependency school shares the realist angle of national interests but
interprets the international system from a South-based perspective.86
According to Dos Santos and Prebisch who advocated the NIEO, the
“underdevelopment” dilemma is due to the unequal neo-colonial trade
relationship between dominant and subordinate economies.87 Dependency
theorists contended that the ongoing external unfairness has subjected the
development of developing countries to the interests of developed
countries.88 International trade only aggravates such dependency and the
inequality among nations by escalating the flow of the South’s economic

81 The existing literature on South-South trade is either outdated or fails to analyze the development
dimensions from a theoretical perspective. See e.g., David Greenaway & Chris Milner, South-South
Trade: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 1 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 47 (1990); James Scott, South-South
Trade and North-South Politics: Emerging Powers and the Reconfiguration of Global Governance (BWPI
Working Paper, No. 131, 2010).
82 Realism is primarily based on HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1954) and
KENNETH WALTZ’S THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). William C. Wohlforth, Realism, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 131, 132–37 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan
Snidal eds., 2008).
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, International Relations, Principal Theories,
in Oxford Public International Law: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e722?rskey=
X2BUQa&result=1&prd=EPIL (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics:
Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 198–99 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986).
85 INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 194 (Paul D’Anieri ed.,
2011).
86 See ALAN GILBERT, MUST GLOBAL POLITICS CONSTRAIN DEMOCRACY? GREAT-POWER
REALISM, DEMOCRATIC PEACE, AND DEMOCRATIC INTERNATIONALISM 32–33 (1999); ALVIN Y. SO,
SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES
91–98 (1990).
87 Dos Santos, supra note 30, at 232–34; see also FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO,
DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16–17 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans.1979);
GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-DRIVEN SOCIAL
JUSTICE 31 (2007).
88 SO, supra note 86, at 95–102.
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surplus to the North.89
As the significant model for North–South trade–development relations,
the 1975 Lomé Convention was signed between the EU and former colonies,
collectively known as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.90
The Lomé Convention responded to NIEO demands by incorporating SDT
that granted preferential treatment to ACP exports.91 Fundamental changes
galvanized the EU’s policy shift. First, the EU lost the “banana war” in the
GATT and the WTO, in which non-ACP countries challenged the legality of
the EU’s preferential banana quotas for ACP countries.92 These cases
mandated the revision of the WTO-inconsistent policy. Second, the fact that
ACP countries could not “even maintain market share in the EU” evidences
the futility of development goals of the Lomé Convention.93 Development
thinking of major EU countries, including Germany and the United
Kingdom, also changed from attaching ties with former European colonies
to stressing the needs of the LDCs and alleviating global poverty.94 For these
reasons, the EU revolutionarily replaced the non-reciprocity policy with the
reciprocal Cotonou Agreement and its related Economic Partnership
Agreements in the 2000s.95
From the viewpoints of realist and dependency theories, the failure of
the EU scheme illustrates the structural weaknesses of development policy
in North–South trade agreements. The asymmetry of the bargaining power
89

Id.
See generally Ole Elgström, Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations and the Impact of
Terms, 5 EURO. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 175, 175–77 (2000); Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie, Beyond
Economic Partnership Agreements: The European Union and the Trade-Development Nexus, 1
CONTEMP. POL. 1, 1–2 (2014).
91 Tony Heron, Trading in Development: Norms and Institutions in the Making/Unmaking of
European Union-African, Caribbean and Pacific Trade and Development Cooperation, in THE TRADEDEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN THE EUROPEAN: DIFFERENTIATION, COHERENCE AND NORMS 10, 12–13
(Maurzio Carbone & Jan Orbie eds., 2015).
92 For the introduction to Banana cases, see Simi T.B. & Atul Kaushik, The Banana War at the
GATT/WTO, TRADE L. BRIEF, No. 1 (2008), at 1–4; Banana War Ends after 20 Years, BBC (Nov. 8,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20263308. See also Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, ‘We
Care about you, but . . .’: The Politics of EU Trade Policy and Development, 3 CAM. REV. INT’L AFF.
497, 501–02 (2013) (detailing the impact of the 1994 GATT case on the EU’s ACP policy).
93 European Commission Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP
Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership, at 9–21, COM
(96) 570 final (Nov. 20, 1996).
94 For positions of major EU countries, see Elgström, supra note 90, at 188–89; Young & Peterson,
supra note 92, at 501.
95 Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat: Information on the Utilisation of
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4 (Feb. 7,
2002), at 12–13. Even the new Economic Partnership Agreements resulted in limited welfare gains in the
Caribbean Community where only the Dominican Republic expanded exports to the EU because of
relative competitive products. Sheldon McLean et al., Trade and Development Nexus: Reflections on the
Performance of Trade in Goods under the CARIFORUM-European Union Partnership Agreement: A
CARIFORUM Perspective, U.N. Doc. LC/CAR/L.458 (Dec. 16, 2014), at 7, 23.
90
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between the EU and ACP countries allowed the former to dictate the terms
of the agreements based on European national interests.96 Preferential trade
relations with the EU magnified its normative power rather than addressing
the development needs of the South. In essence, the Europe-centric
“development-friendly” regime distorted ACP countries’ effective resource
allocation and hindered industrialization. The economic flow to Europe was
expedited because the value of industrial imports substantially outweighed
that of agricultural exports, thus exacerbating ACP countries’ dependency on
Europe.
The evolution of the NREO is based on the changing nature of South–
South trade. Prebisch argued for South–South trade as a means to end
developing countries’ dependency on developed countries, but this position
waned following the NIEO’s failure.97 The economic rationale for South–
South trade includes decreasing the dependency on the North by diversifying
risks and increasing self-reliance through the import substitution policy.98
Given limited domestic markets, it became essential for developing countries
to expand the suitable overseas market, where they would not suffer from a
weaker comparative advantage.99 Commentators have criticized the
development potential in South–South trade on the ground that the validity
of such arrangements is confined by economies of scale and the prevalent use
of non-tariff-barriers (NTBs).100 The NREO development refutes this
pessimistic contention.
The NREO emerged in Third Regionalism with different geopolitical
complexities. South–South trade grew from 8% to 25% of international trade,
and the proliferation of Asia–Pacific FTAs in the Doha Round reflects this
trend.101 The paradigm shift in a high degree of Asia–Pacific regionalism
provides an impetus for the trade–development linkage. Realism posits that
competition necessitated by “self-help” makes it difficult for countries to
cooperate on trade liberalization.102 Nevertheless, cooperation can be a
96 See Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations: Realism,
Dependence or Interdependence, 1 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 107–09 (2011) (analyzing
the EU’s bargaining power and self-interests).
97 Adekeye Adebajo, Two Prophets of Regional Integration: Prebisch and Adedeji, in
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEAS, EXPERIENCE, AND PROSPECTS 323, 328 (Bruce Currie-Alder et
al. eds., 2014).
98 Bhagwati, supra note 29, at 539; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50; Mehdi Shafaeddin,
South-South Regionalism and Trade Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, UNDP Regional Centre in
Colombo (2008), at 5–7.
99 Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50. Cf. Shafaeddin, supra note 98, at viii, 5–8.
100 See, e.g., ROLLAND, supra note 17, at 267–68; Greenaway & Milner, supra note 81, at 49–50.
101 See World Trade Report (2014), supra note 59, at 42 (stating that “South-South trade . . . has grown
from 8 per cent of world trade in 1990 to around 25 per cent today, and is projected to reach 30 per cent
by 2030”); see also World Trade Report (2011), supra note 68, at 59 (indicating the increase of Asiabased FTAs).
102 See Glaser, supra note 30, at 50–51 (discussing the realist view of cooperation in security issues).
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salient way of self-help when national interests overlap.103 Driven by
geographic proximity and comparable economic levels, South–South trade
likely involves less of the economic conflict inherent in North–South trade.
The convergence of trade and development interests has prompted the
conclusion of a new generation of WTO-plus South–South FTAs. The
inclusion of emerging markets in the Asia–Pacific improves economies of
scale and consolidates regional supply chains.
The dependency theory may not fully explain the progression of North–
South relations in the NREO. The classical dependency school suggests that
as dominant–subordinate relations perpetuate underdevelopment of the
South, the only “way out” is to sever trade ties with developed countries.104
Despite the structural weaknesses in North–South trade, the development
impact of capital and technology from developed nations cannot be utterly
disregarded. This isolation stance also contradicts the evolution of exportoriented Asian economies and their trans-regional FTAs with the United
States and the EU.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Thomas Gold propounded the “new
dependency theory,” which acknowledges the co-existence of dependency
and development.105 Unlike the classical theory, which is preoccupied with
the external unequal condition, the new theory focuses on the impact of
evolving internal structures on altering the South’s relations with the
North.106 Dependency is dynamic, as developing countries can effectively
transform dependent capitalism to a neo-liberal export-oriented economy.107
The South’s high value-added exports, such as IT products, have helped
reverse the traditional North-bound economic flow. Supply chain
adjustments in accordance with South–South FTAs also increases cost
competitiveness in developed markets. Hence, the new dependency theory
offers a theoretical response to the NREO, as developing countries
collectively reconstruct the conventional dominant–subordinate relations by
formulating a pro-development trade scheme.
III. THE PARADIGM SHIFT: IN SEARCH OF THE NEW
REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
The Doha Round has failed to cement the trade–development nexus in
103

Id. at 53; Serrano, supra note 96, at 111.
SO, supra note 86, at 104–05.
105 See generally FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL (1999);
THOMAS BARON GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE (1986); SO, supra note 86, at 164–
65.
106 Serrano, supra note 96, at 104; SO, supra note 86, at 137–42.
107 Gold examined Taiwan’s development model and explained how the country transformed its
dependent relations with Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal export-oriented economy.
See generally GOLD, supra note 105, at 21–90; SO, supra note 86, at 157–64.
104
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the WTO. The flawed approach to development through SDT overlooks the
reality of the Grand Bargain in the multilateral trading system. The NREO
that surfaced in Third Regionalism provides a feasible “Plan B” for
developing countries. By legalizing pro-development policy in FTAs, South–
South cooperation reflects the latest development in Asia–Pacific FTAs and
signifies the developing countries’ changing position from rule-takers to
rule-makers in international economic law. The case study of ASEAN will
substantiate the expectations of realism and the new dependency theory. The
creation of the AEC reinforces a paradigm shift in Asia–Pacific regionalism
based on ASEAN+1 FTAs and provides the Global South with critical
lessons to implement the SDGs through services trade-oriented development
policy.
A. The Creation of the ASEAN Economic Community
As a crucial pillar of the ASEAN Community, the establishment of the
AEC in 2015 marked a milestone for South–South FTAs and global
regionalism.108 The AEC fortifies the multipolar structure in international
economic law, since the bloc moves toward forming one of the world’s four
largest economies, following the United States, the EU and China.109
Tellingly, a vast development gap exists between the six original nations
(ASEAN-6) and the four newer LDC members—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar
and Vietnam (CLMV countries).110 It is therefore crucial for the AEC to
design a legal framework that implements the SDGs in economic integration
balanced with diverse development needs.
The founding of ASEAN in 1967 was primarily driven by political
rather than economic considerations to form solidarity against the spread of
communism and to peacefully settle territorial disputes.111 The post-colonial
mindset energized the “ASEAN way” of alliance that emphasizes non108 See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2015), supra note 28
(“D[eclaring] the formal establishment of the ASEAN Community on 31 December 2015.”). The ASEAN
Community consists of the AEC, the ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN SocioCultural Community. Id.
109 See Lord Davies, UK-ASEAN Business Council, in INVESTING IN ASEAN 11, 11 (2013–14) (“The
ten ASEAN member states currently have a combined [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] similar to the
UK’s, and by 2030, the ASEAN economy is predicted to be the fourth largest single market after the EU,
US and China”).
110 “ASEAN-6” countries include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. GDP per capita of Singapore is 44 times that of Myanmar in 2014. Table 7: Gross Domestic
Product Per Capita in ASEAN, at Current Prices (Nominal), in US Dollars (2015),
http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/table7.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2017).
111 RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS
FROM THE FORMER ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL 1-7 (2006). For intra-ASEAN territorial disputes, see
Walter Woon, Resolving Territorial Disputes in ASEAN, 30 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 1,
3–10 (2012).
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intervention and consensus-based principles.112 ASEAN’s soft-law approach
based on horizontal integration features its significant difference from the
EU, which has followed a hard-law, top-down approach to achieve the
economic union.113 In 1992, faced with global regionalism and the rise of
China and India, ASEAN countries switched their focus to economic
integration by forging the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).114 Nonetheless,
the effectiveness of the AFTA was undermined by the low rate of utilization
because of insignificant margins of preferences and complex procedures to
qualify the rules of origin.115
In 2007, ASEAN bolstered the integration by approving the ASEAN
Economic Community Blueprint (AEC Blueprint 2015), which set 2015 as
the target for forming “a single market and production base.”116 The adoption
of the ASEAN Charter formally transformed the loosely connected bloc into
an internal governmental institution that accelerated achievement of the AEC
goals.117 Due to the EU’s embedded problems with the euro crisis and border
control, the AEC envisions becoming an FTA-plus arrangement rather than
following the European model as an economic union.
The legalization of the AEC, which connects ten diverse developing
countries, illustrates South–South cooperation in the NREO. The AEC
framework is built upon ASEAN agreements that govern dispute settlement
mechanisms, trade in goods, services commitments, and investments. The
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) eliminates NTBs and
incorporates previous goods-related agreements concluded since the
formation of the AFTA.118 Based on the incremental “package” structure,
negotiations under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)
led to multiple packages of services commitments.119
The mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) and the ASEAN
Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (ASEAN MNP Agreement)
112 Id. at 1–37; see also Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Charter Preamble (2007)
(stressing the respect for “the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference,
consensus and unity in diversity”).
113 In contrast with hard law, soft law motivates integration by peer pressure rather than enforcement.
For four different types of economic integration in preferential trade arrangements, see Cooper, supra
note 75, at 2.
114 See generally SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 16–21; Chia Siow Yue, The ASEAN Free Trade Area,
11 PAC. REV. no. 2, 213, 213–17 (1998).
115 Ganeshan Wignaraja, Regional Trade Agreements and Enterprises in Southeast Asia 4 (ADBI
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 442, 2013).
116 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 22.
Note that in 2015, ASEAN also adopted the ASEAN Blueprint 2025. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations,
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 1.
117 See Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations Charter, supra note 112, at art. 3 (“ASEAN, as intergovernmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality”).
118 Kanya Satyani Sasradipoera, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER
THE CHARTER 89, 90–92 (S. Tiwari ed., 2010).
119 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Integration in Services (2013), at 3–13.
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complement the AFAS by liberalizing the flow of intra-regional skilled
labor.120 To increase the bloc’s competitiveness to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
(ACIA) integrates prior agreements, thus streamlining the schedule of
reservations and according benefits to ASEAN investors.121 ASEAN has also
developed multilayered dispute settlement mechanisms. Non-economic
conflicts can be resolved under ASEAN’s first legally binding treaty, the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the subsequent ASEAN
Charter.122 Trade disputes fall within the realm of the ASEAN Protocol for
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (EDSM).123 The TAC and the
EDSM focus on state-to-state disputes, whereas the ACIA confers private
investors the right to resort to investor-state arbitration.124
B. Regional and Mega FTAs in the Asia-Pacific
Unlike the French–German coordination that contributed to European
integration, a leadership vacuum caused by the China–Japan rivalry allows
ASEAN to play an indispensable role in Asia–Pacific regionalism. The
realist assertion that mutual interests prompt cooperation is demonstrated not
only in the AEC that legalizes internal integration, but also in ASEAN’s
external FTAs. Since 2002, ASEAN concluded five ASEAN+1 FTAs with
China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand.125 The internal and
external FTAs form an interlocked mechanism, resulting in the FTA-wide de
facto MFN effect that mutually reinforces trade liberalization.
The ASEAN framework also validates the premise of the new
dependency theory to transform the South’s neo-colonial trade relations with
the North. The AEC and the FTAs with China and India illustrate South–
South cooperation in Third Regionalism. The “North” encompasses intraregional developed economies such as Japan and Australia and extra-regional

120

Id. at 15–17.
The new agreement integrates the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (1987 Agreement), the 1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, and
two related protocols. Yap Lai Peng, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009: Its
Objectives, Plan and Progress, in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 100, 101 (S. Tiwari ed., 2010).
122 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 11–12; Locknie Hsu, The ASEAN Dispute Settlement System, in THE
ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 380, 383–86 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds.,
2013).
123 Hsu, supra note 122, at 386–89.
124 Id. Note that the 2003 case of Yaung Chi Oo Trading v. Myanmar was the first and only instance
where ASEAN dealt with legal disputes. The investor-state dispute concerned the interpretation of the
1987 Agreement and the Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction. Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Gov’t
of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1.
125 ASEAN’s first external FTA was concluded with China in 2002. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations,
ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), at 81–90.
121
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powers, including the United States and the EU.126 These developments not
only repudiate contentions against South–South FTAs, but also support this
article’s analysis of the NREO.
Built on the five ASEAN+1 FTAs, the ASEAN-based RCEP will create
a market that links 16 Asia-Pacific countries.127 The two mega FTAs, the
RCEP and the TPP, will form pathways to the prospective Free Trade Area
of the Asia–Pacific (FTAAP), which Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) leaders endorsed.128 The RCEP is expected to increase businesses’
FTA utilization by solving the “noodle bowl” syndrome because of the
complex rules of origin.129 More profoundly, the RCEP will strengthen
ASEAN’s assertive balance of power strategy that converges the South–
South and North–South FTAs under the notion of ASEAN centrality.
In essence, both ASEAN’s internal and external FTAs regionalize
WTO-type special and preferential treatment. A critical feature is permitting
CLMV countries to have longer transition periods to phase out tariffs and
NTBs.130 Under the AEC, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI)
proposes to narrow the regional development gap and alleviate poverty by
providing technical assistance to implement economic integration.131
Provisions on capacity building of ASEAN+1 FTAs that focus on the least
developed CLMV countries also complement the IAI.132 In dispute
settlement provisions, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA specifically
recognizes SDT.133 If a given dispute involves an ASEAN LDC, other
126 See Clinton, supra note 26, at 61 (emphasizing US engagement in ASEAN); European
Commission, supra note 76, at 32 (indicating the negotiations for the EU-ASEAN FTA).
127 The 16 countries include ten ASEAN states and six FTA partners. For an analysis of the RCEP,
see A Powerhouse Merger in RCEP, MBC Research Report, No. 110 at 2–5 (2013),
http://mbc.com.ph/2013/07/04/mbc-research-report-no-110-august-2013/; Urata, supra note 28, at 6–9.
128 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], 2015 Leaders’ Declaration: The 23rd APEC
Economic Leaders’ Declaration - Building Inclusive Economies, Building a Better World: A Vision for
an Asia-Pacific Community (2015), sec. 7(b). Currently, four ASEAN members are in both the TPP and
the RCEP and seven ASEAN states are APEC members. The Trans-Pacific Partnership,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
(last
visited Aug. 13, 2017); ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC OUTCOMES & OUTLOOK 2014–2015,
at 51 (2015).
129 See Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism 4
(ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, Working Paper No. 7, 2007) (referring
the problem due to “an unorganized tangle of bilateral trade deals”).
130 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries) usually have five or more years to
eliminate tariffs in the AEC and five ASEAN+1 FTAs. Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015
(2009), supra note 116, at 22–23; Urata, supra note 28, at 15.
131 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), supra note 116, at 95–106.
132 E.g., Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments
of the Member Countries of the Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] and the People’s Republic
of China [ASEAN-China Framework Agreement] (2002), art. 7; Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Ass’n
of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea (2005), art. 3.2.
133 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (Feb. 27, 2009), art.
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countries shall give “particular sympathetic consideration.”134 Moreover, the
arbitral tribunal is obliged to “explicitly indicate” how SDT provisions of the
FTA have been taken into account.135
C. The Services Trade-Oriented Approach to Development
As argued previously, the NREO moved beyond the SDT-centered
agenda of the NIEO. What evidences the NREO is not simply the design of
SDT provisions in ASEAN-based FTAs but also the Grand Bargain
developing countries have engaged in and the resultant trade-led
development effect. As of 2015, Southeast Asia exceeded the target of the
MDGs by halving the population living in extreme poverty.136 Yet, to “[e]nd
poverty in all its forms” under the SDGs requires a revolutionary strategy to
assist 30% of ASEAN’s poor still living on less than US$2 a day.137 Against
this backdrop, I propose a holistic services trade-oriented approach to
development. These regulatory reform proposals bridge the gap between law
and practice and will invigorate the trade–development nexus and offer best
practices for South–South FTAs.
The Grand Bargain among the ten ASEAN countries has virtually
achieved the zero-tariff target.138 Compared with trade in goods, liberalizing
trade in services is far more politically sensitive because the service sector
involves the inflow of foreign capital and labor. The behind-the-border
barriers to services trade make the negotiations inherently complex. At the
global level, the Doha Round standoff has stalled much-needed services trade
talks. The ongoing plurilateral negotiations of the Trade in Services
Agreement involve very few developing countries, including none of the
ASEAN states.139 Before demonstrating ASEAN’s trade liberalization as an
NREO approach to South–South regionalism, it is important to understand
the oft-ignored impact of services trade on development and poverty
18, Ch. 17.
134 Id. art. 18(1).
135 Id. art. 18(2).
136 Millennium Development Goals Report (2015), DEP’T OF ECON & SOC. AFFAIRS OF THE U.N.
SECRETARIAT, at 14 (showing an 84% decrease in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in
Southeast Asia between 1990 and 2015).
137 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goal 1; Report of the ASEAN Regional
Assessment of MDG Achievement and Post-2015 Development Priorities (2015), THE ASEAN
SECRETARIAT, at 19.
138 The ASEAN Free Trade Area requires ASEAN-6 countries and CLMV countries to eliminate
tariffs on intra-ASEAN goods by 2010 and 2015, respectively. Masahiro Kawai & Kanda Naknoi, ASEAN
Economic Integration through Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-Term Challenges, ADBI
WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 545 (October 2015), at 12; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 20092015 (2009), supra note 116, at 22–23.
139 There are 23 participants in the negotiations. Trade in Services Agreement List of Participants.
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). https://ustr.gov/tisa/participantlist.
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reduction.
First, the reduction of barriers to services trade empirically leads to
significant GDP gains and stipulates more economic competitiveness than
mere tariff eliminations.140 Development policies have traditionally centered
on manufacturing rather than services.141 Contrary to the conventional
understanding that services should only be prioritized at an advanced
development stage, services are a prerequisite to inclusive development and
economic modernization.142 Notably, transport, finance, and internet services
constitute the backbone of trade in goods. The fact that a 10% increase in
trade in services results in a 6% growth in trade in goods is evidence of the
strong correlation between the two major modes of trade.143
Second, from the global perspective of development, the services trade
has outgrown agriculture and mining and helped buttress the welfare of the
poor.144 For example, health services liberalization maximizes the delivery
of health care to the needy, and tourism services allow up to 25% of tourism
expenditures to directly reach the poor in LDCs.145 FDIs in developing
countries are now primarily associated with the service sector and hence
augment the effect of poverty reduction through job creation.146 Labor
mobility in services trade results in a financial inflow of remittances and
helps the poor escape poverty.147 In the case of the Philippines, remittances
constitute 10% of the GDP and are mostly spent on rural families’ basic needs
140 Jeffery J. Schott et al., Prospects for Services Trade Negotiations, ADB ECONOMICS WORKINGS
PAPER SERIES, No. 319 (2012), at 16; Mid-Term Review of the Implementation of AEC Blueprint:
Executive Summary (2012), ECON. RES. INST. FOR ASEAN & EAST ASIA JAKARTA, at 30.
141 ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless Economic Community [ASEAN 2030], ASIAN DEV. BANK
INST. 120 (2014).
142 Zakariah Rashid et al., Regional Market for Goods, Services, and Skilled Labor, in REALIZING THE
ASEAN ECON. CMTY.: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 20, 44 (Michael G. Plummer & Chia Siow Yue
eds., 2009); ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 120.
143 JUAN BLYDE & NATALIA SINYAVSKAYA, THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES ON
TRADE IN GOODS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION, 11:3 REV. DEV. ECON. 566, 573 (2007).
144 ASEAN Integration Monitoring Report 93, ASEAN SECRETARIAT AND THE WORLD BANK (2013);
Joy Abrenica et al., The Future of Trade in Services for Developing Countries, in TRADE AND POVERTY
REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES 341, 347–48 (Andrew L. Stoler et al. eds., 2009).
145 Aaditya Mattoo & Gianni Zanini, Services Trade Agreements and Negotiations: An Overview, in
HANDBOOK OF TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT 661, 665 (Arvid Lukauskas et al. eds., 2013); Jonathan
Mitchell, An Unconventional but Essential Marriage: Pro-Poor Tourism and the Mainstream Industry,
PRIVATE SECTOR & DEV., No. 7 (2010), at 5.
146 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services of Apr. 7, 2010, S/C/W/314, Mode
3 Commercial Presence, [Mode 3], at 9 (“[S]ervices accounted for 65 per cent of developing economies’
inward FDI stock and for 86 per cent of their outward FDI . . . .”); ASEAN Community 2015: Managing
Integration for Better Jobs and Shared Prosperity (2014) [ASEAN Community 2015], INT’L LAB. ORG.
& ASIAN DEV. BANK, at 33 (discussing the significant job creation effect of services sectors in Malaysia,
Indonesia and the Philippines).
147 IAN GOLDIN & KENNETH REINERT, GLOBALIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT: MEETING NEW
CHALLENGES 197 (2012).
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such as food and medical payment.148 The amount of remittances that
Cambodia receives exceeds 50% of its overseas development aid, further
evidencing the compelling impact of services trade on development.149
Finally, trade in services provides new sources of development that help
countries escape from the “middle-income trap” that often occurs in middleincome developing countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.150
These countries rely on their low-cost, labor-intensive advantage as their
initial development strategy.151 As industrialization and urbanization exhaust
the pool of unskilled labor and push wage increases to their upper limit, their
cost competitiveness is eroded and these countries become “stuck” in
economic stagnation.152 The modernization of the services trade and the
associated technology transformation are the essential impetus to take these
countries to an elevated level of development.153
IV. THE LEGALIZATION OF TRADE–DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Based on ASEAN’s evolution as a timely case study, this article
provides the first examination of the realization of the UN Sustainable
Development Goals through regional integration. In Third Regionalism, the
AEC integration through multilayered FTAs manifests the paradigm shift
toward the NREO. As realism and the new dependency theories explain, the
new generation of South–South cooperation expediting trade liberalization
structurally revamps Southeast Asia’s neo-colonial relationship with
developed countries. Amid the Doha Round impasse, a regional approach to
development serves as a feasible “Plan B.” A holistic approach to services
trade liberalization illustrates the legalization of trade–development policy
that consolidates services commitments and facilitates labor mobility. The
roadmap for regulatory reform focuses on integrating development
assistance, removing trade barriers, harmonizing domestic laws, and
fortifying human rights protection under the FTA network. An assessment of
ASEAN’s legal framework and reform proposals in tandem with the SDGs
148 Building Human Capital through Labor Migration in Asia (2015), ASIAN DEV. BANK INST., INT’L
LAB. ORG. & OECD, at 14, 37.
149 In 2010, Cambodia received US$364 million in remittances and its net overseas development aid
totaled US$0.7 billion. Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, THE WORLD BANK (2d ed. 2011), at
84. See also Rupa Chanda, Mobility of Less-Skilled Workers under Bilateral Agreements: Lessons for the
GATS, 43:3 J. WORLD TRADE 479, 479 (“[R]emittances . . . outweigh official development assistance”).
150 Tran Van Tho, The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, ADBI WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 421 (2013), at 22–29.
151 Pierre-Richard Agénor et al., Avoiding Middle-Income Traps, ECO. PREMISE, No. 98 (2012), at 2–
3.
152 Id.
153 Kenichi Ohno, The Middle Income Trap: Implications for Industrialization Strategies in East Asia
and Africa, GRIP DEVELOPMENT FORUM (2008), at 93–112; Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China
and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-Income Trap (2014), OECD, at 20.
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provides valuable lessons for the Global South to craft pro-development
services trade and migration policy.
A. Integrating and Multilateralizing Services Commitments
Trade in services is the essential driver of development in ASEAN
countries.154 The service sector, which accounts for 60% of FDI inflows and
50% of total employment, has contributed to the bloc’s noteworthy 76%
surge in the GDP growth in recent years.155 Recognizing the growing
prominence of the services trade, ASEAN states commenced negotiations
under the AFAS in 1995.156 The goal is to achieve “a free trade area in
services” that exceeds the level of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).157 In the context of the SDGs, services trade energizes
ASEAN’s implementation of poverty reduction, economic growth and
elimination of the regional inequality.158 This development approach also
creates employment opportunities for women and promotes gender
equality.159
Moreover, to avoid the political backlash that hampers liberalization in
South–South FTAs, the AFAS adopted a successive package structure.
Schedules of services commitments concluded under multiple rounds of
negotiations cumulatively “form an integral part of” the AFAS.160 Due to the
AFAS’s non-self-executing nature, each state is required to sign the protocol
that embodies specific commitments.161 Each package of commitments will
not take effect until the completion of domestic ratification procedures.162
The AFAS’ incremental approach eases domestic protectionism and
facilitates domestic reforms. In addition to the ten packages of services
commitments (AFAS 1-10), ASEAN concluded separate packages of
financial services and air transport services.163 The AFAS incorporates these
154 See generally Asian Development Outlook 2015: Financing Asia’s Future Growth (2015), ASIAN
DEV. BANK, at 209–47.
155 ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT & THE WORLD BANK, at
i–ii; A Blueprint for Growth – ASEAN Economic Community 2015: Progress and Key Achievements
(2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT, at 1.
156 ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT, at 27.
157 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (1995) [AFAS], art. I(c).
158 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goals 1, 8 and 10.
159 Id. Goal 5; JIM REDDEN, Introduction, TRADE AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1, 13 (Andrew L. Stoler et al.
eds., 2009).
160 Id. art. VIII.
161 E.g., ASEAN, Protocol to Implement the Ninth Package of Commitments under the ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services (2014), arts. 4–5.
162 Id.
163 As of November 2015, nine packages of AFAS commitments have been concluded. While ASEAN
economic ministers negotiated and signed the packages of the general AFAS commitments, the
liberalization of financial services and air transport services was carried out by finance and transport
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general and sector-specific services commitments and thus constitutes the
AEC’s foundation of a single market and production base.
Modeled after the GATS, the AFAS covers four modes of the services
trade: Mode 1 (cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3
(commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons or
MNP).164 WTO members’ Modes 3 and 4 commitments are subject to the
most restrictions.165 ASEAN countries’ liberalization of these modes under
the AFAS demonstrates the developing countries’ Grand Bargain in Southbased regionalism. Given the importance of increasing the free flow of intraregional professionals, the ASEAN MNP agreement will supersede Mode 4
commitments under the existing AFAS packages.166 The MRAs will further
promote the movement of skilled labor by facilitating the recognition of
qualifications for eight professions.167 More importantly, ASEAN expects to
adopt the single undertaking approach to negotiate the comprehensive
ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), which will consolidate
various forms of services commitments.168
The evolution of services negotiation modalities for the AEC provides
legal and policy options for the NREO approach to development. AFAS
negotiations initially followed a more conservative GATS-like positive list
formula, which limits liberalization to scheduled sectors.169 The request-andoffer bargain obliged ASEAN states to list the sectors and modes of supply
that they wished to liberalize in binding schedules. Liberalization efforts
were expedited by endorsing a common sub-sector approach, which denoted
a sub-sector in which three or four ASEAN states made commitments under
the GATS or previous AFAS packages.170 The concessions in the sub-sector
had to be multilateralized to all ASEAN countries. In other words, those
ministers, respectively. ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), supra note 156, at xix, 29; ASEAN
Integration in Services (2013), supra note 119, at 13–14.
164 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATT 1994), art. I:2.
165 Mode 3, supra note 146, at 17; World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services of Sept.
15, 2009, S/C/W/301, Mode 4 Presence of Natural Persons [hereinafter Presence of Natural Persons
(Mode 4)], at 20–25.
166 ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (2012) [ASEAN MNP Agreement], art.
6:2.
167 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 33–34 (Nov. 20, 2015), http://asean.org/storage/2015/12/
ASEAN-Integration-Report-2015.pdf.
168 Joint Media Statement, The 46th ASEAN Economic Ministers’ (AEM) Meeting, 5 (Aug. 25,
2014), http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/00-AEM-48-JMS-FINAL.pdf. This approach follows the model
of the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA). STEFANO INAMA & EDMUND W. SIM, THE
FOUNDATION OF THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROFILE 127
(2015);
ASEAN
Economic
Community
Blueprint
2025,
6
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf.
169 This approach resulted in the first two packages of AFAS commitments (AFAS 1-2). ASEAN
Integration in Services, 10 (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2013/
resources/publication/2013%20(9.%20Sep)%20-%20ASEAN%20Integration%20in%20Services.pdf.
170 AFAS 3–6 followed the common sub-sector approach. Id.
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countries that made no corresponding commitments could be free riders.
To effectuate the Grand Bargain that would result in pro-development
trade liberalization, ASEAN implemented the ASEAN Minus X modality in
2003.171 Two or more states could initiate negotiations and liberalize selected
sectors, permitting other states to join subsequently.172 Different from the
common sub-sector approach, the concessions would only be granted on a
reciprocal basis so that the free rider problem could be eliminated. Thus,
ASEAN integration would not be dragged down to the pace of countries that
were unwilling to cooperate and the benefits of liberalization could
incentivize these states to make further commitments.173
The year 2007 marked the adoption of the AEC Blueprint 2015, a
revolutionary change that envisioned a single market and production base by
the end of 2015.174 The Blueprint mandated salient reforms to eliminate
“substantially all restrictions on trade in services.”175 The less sensitive
Modes 1 and 2 were expected to be completely liberalized.176 Significantly,
the AEC is not modeled after the EU due to the limited liberalization scope
of Modes 3 and 4, which face strong domestic protectionism. The
compromise on Mode 3 permits 70% rather than 100% of ASEAN equity
participation.177 Mode 4 concerns the increase of competition from foreign
nationals. The AEC framework is confined to the free flow of skilled labor
to the exclusion of low-skilled and unskilled labor.178 Furthermore, the
ASEAN Minus X formula continues to apply, and a 15% overall flexibility
enables member states to carve out sensitive services industries from
commitments.179
These designs have formed a balance between the regulatory
sovereignty and the regional integration under South–South FTAs. Since
1995, successive AFAS packages of commitments have transformed from

171 Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (2003), Article
IV bis (ASEAN Minus X modality) was added to the AFAS. This modality can be traced back to the
Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (2012). SEVERINO, supra note 111,
at 352.
172 Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation art. I:3.
173 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352–53.
174 The AEC Blueprint has governed the negotiations of AFAS 7 and subsequent packages of
commitments. ASEAN Integration in Services, supra note 169, at 19; Deunden Nikomborirak &
Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, An Assessment of Services Sector Liberalization in ASEAN, in ASEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 47, 48 (Sanchita Basu Das ed.,
2013).
175 For the actions of the AEC Blueprint, refer to Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015,
26 (Apr., 2009), http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/2_Roadmap_for_ASEAN_
Community_20092015.pdf.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 29–30.
179 Id. at 26, n.2.
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marginally to substantially GATS-plus.180 The level of services liberalization
under ASEAN’s internal FTAs mutually reinforces the liberalization under
the region-based external FTAs. The interlocked mechanism secures the
certainty of domestic reform and energizes deeper liberalization based on the
threshold of the most recently concluded or updated commitments. Critically,
the implicit mechanism consolidates South–South cooperation and
revitalizes North–South relations in line with development goals.
The sequential approach also facilitates the extra-regionalization of
ASEAN-centered regionalism that buttresses the bloc’s balance of power
policy. With the exception of the single undertaking approach of the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, other ASEAN+1 FTAs allow
essential components of FTAs to be separately concluded under a framework
agreement.181 The model was based on the significant South–South trade
pact, the ASEAN–China FTA, which was built upon agreements on goods,
services, investment, and the dispute settlement mechanism.182 This FTA,
which took eight years to complete, is critical to Beijing’s “One Belt One
Road” initiative and ASEAN’s development target to attract FDI inflows.183
With respect to services commitments, ASEAN FTAs with China and
Korea adopted the AFAS-like package structure.184 While the first package
under the ASEAN–China FTA contained rare “GATS-minus” commitments,
the subsequent package remedied the situation by elevating the commitments
to GATS-plus.185 ASEAN’s most recent breakthrough was the conclusion of
a services agreement with India, which has been ultraconservative about
service liberalization.186 The fact that the liberalization level of the AFAS
surpasses that of ASEAN+1 FTAs ensures the AEC’s integration and
provides an impetus for RCEP and FTAAP liberalization.187 In turn, the
180 David Chin Soon Siong, ASEAN’s Journey Towards Free Trade, in ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY:
ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS BY SINGAPORE’S NEGOTIATORS 209, 215 (C. L. Lim & Margaret Liang eds.,
2010); ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 167, at 29–30.
181 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 167, at 95–102.
182 ASEAN Economic Community Factbook, 81–82 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/images/2012/publications/ASEAN%20Economic%20Community%20Factbook.pdf.
183 The ASEAN-China FTA began in 2002 and was finalized in 2010. Id.; ASEAN Integration Report
2015, supra note 167, at 96; China to Align Belt and Road with ASEAN’s Development Strategies, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 6, 2015, http://english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2015/08/06/
content_281475162278714.htm.
184 Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hikari Ishido, Assessing the Progress of Services Liberalization in the
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2013), at 14.
185 See id. at 3–15 (explaining the rationale for General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)minus commitments and the comparison between two packages).
186 Agreement on Trade in Services under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India (Nov. 13,
2014), http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/pdf/2014_upload/reducedASEAN-India%20Trade
%20in%20Services%20Agreement%20-%20Scanned%20ASEAN%20version%20copy.pdf.
187 For the FTAs’ various levels of services liberalization, see Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 184, at
7; Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study,
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economic growth led by services trade will revitalize developing countries’
external trade relations and reinforce the regional development objectives of
the SDGs.
B. Accelerating Cross-Border Labor Mobility
Transnational labor mobility in services trade is a paramount
development tool. Going beyond the poverty reduction effect of remittances,
circular migration brings back skills and experiences that benefit the
economic development of the original countries.188 Nonetheless, allowing the
entry of foreign nationals is among the most sensitive issues in international
economic law because it is often perceived as opening the backdoor for
immigration. Not surprisingly, the WTO and FTA commitments to the
temporary movement of natural persons (Mode 4) are far more restrictive
than other modes of supply.189 For instance, in the face of congressional
objections, the United States’ FTA policy turned conservative about Mode 4
commitments subsequent to the FTAs with Chile and Singapore.190 Similarly,
the TPP provisions on the temporary entry of business persons are expected
to be contested in U.S. Congress and other parliaments at the ratification
stage.191
For these reasons, ASEAN’s labor mobility exemplifies an NREO
approach to cement the trade–development nexus through the liberalization
of Mode 4 and benefit the SDG target of “full and productive
employment.”192 Distinct from the EU’s freedom of movement, the AEC
confines the free flow of labor to skilled workers in order to reconcile
political resistance with economic integration.193 From a regional
development perspective, the Mode 4 progress eases the shortage of

ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 16.
188 Simon Feeny & Mark McGillivray, The Role of ASEAN Connectivity in Reducing the Development
Gap, in NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 84, 113 (Mark
McGillivray & David Carpenter eds., 2013); Graeme Hugo, What we Know About Circular Migration
POLICY
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
2013),
and
Enhanced
Mobility,
MIGRATION
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-about-circular-migration-and-enhancedmobility.
189 WTO Secretariat, GATS, Mode 4 and the Pattern of Commitments: Background Information, 3
(Apr. 11–12, 2002); Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 25.
190 Sherry Stephenson & Gary Hufbauer, Labor Mobility, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 275, 281–83 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe
Maur eds., 2011).
191 See generally The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 128, at Ch. 12.
192 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 8
(2015),
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/brochure/SDGs_Booklet_Web_
En.pdf.
193 The EU concept of freedom of movement, see the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (2012), art. 45, 2012 O.J. (C 326/49).
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professionals in more developed ASEAN countries.194 In addition, the
liberalization will narrow the bloc’s development gap by allowing skilled
workers in CLMV countries to increase their income by 14–20%.195
Recognizing these pro-development benefits, ASEAN enacted treaties
that underpin the AEC’s Mode 4 framework, which includes the ASEAN
MNP Agreement and MRAs. Mode 3 obligations of commercial presence
under the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement also complement
Mode 4 liberalization. To facilitate ASEAN enterprises’ regional operation,
the ACIA authorizes the entry, temporary stay, and work of “investors,
executives, managers and members of the board of directors” in member
states.196
Pursuant to the AEC Blueprint, the ASEAN MNP Agreement, which
will supersede AFAS Mode 4 commitments, applies to skilled labor rather
than all “natural persons.”197 It accelerates the movement of intra-corporate
transferees, business visitors, contractual service suppliers, and other
professionals as defined in states’ schedules of commitments.198 Essentially,
the agreement extends only to the service sector.199 For example, an intraregional transfer of a Singapore-based sales manager of an agricultural or
manufacturing plant in Myanmar falls outside the scope of the agreement, as
neither agriculture nor manufacturing belongs to the service sector.
Nonetheless, the Singapore manager’s entry to other ASEAN countries for
business trips is guaranteed under the ACIA, which covers “services
incidental to” the non-service sectors.200
Akin to the GATS, the ASEAN MNP Agreement covers services
provision on a non-permanent basis, so that intra-regional labor mobility will
not become a political immigration issue that impedes the development of
South–South FTAs. The agreement facilitates the “temporary” entry or stay
of service providers.201 Because of the ambiguity as to what length of time
194 For example, Brunei and Thailand have faced a shortage of skilled labor in certain sectors. Philip
Martin & Manolo Abella, Reaping the Economic and Social Benefits of Labour Mobility: ASEAN 2015,
ILO Asia-Pacific Working Paper Series (2014), at 33; Labor Migration, Skills & Student Mobility in Asia,
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE (2014), at 31.
195 ASEAN Community 2015, supra note 146, at 72.
196 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement [ACIA] art. 22 (2009), http://www.asean.org/
storage/images/2013/economic/aia/ACIA_Final_Text_26%20Feb%202009.pdf.
The
preferential
treatment under the ASEAN MNP Agreement applies to these key positions identified in the ACIA.
ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 12:2.
197 ASEAN MNP Agreement preamble, supra note 166.
198 Id. art. 2:1. Intra-corporate transferees include executives, managers and specialists employed by
companies.
199 The Agreement stipulates that it covers persons engaged in trade in services, goods and
investments, but none of the ASEAN countries made commitments in non-services sectors. Id. preamble
& art. 1(b); Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Hirari Ishido, Values and Limitations of the ASEAN Agreement on
the Movement of Natural Persons, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2015), at 5.
200 ACIA, supra note 196, at art. 3:3(f).
201 ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 3:3(f).
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“temporary” entails, the commitments of ASEAN states vary largely across
different categories of natural persons.202 The agreement explicitly excludes
the governments’ “measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the
employment market” and “measures regarding citizenship, residence or
employment on a permanent basis.”203 ASEAN states are therefore allowed
to maintain visa requirements for public purposes, provided that the benefits
under the agreement are not nullified or impaired.204 The potential for skilled
worker migration within ASEAN is arguably undermined because the
agreement does not authorize the permanent entry of professionals.205
In addition to the Mode 4 commitments under the ASEAN MNP
Agreement, ASEAN’s MRAs facilitate the recognition of qualifications and
advance intra-regional labor mobility. As MRAs require significant changes
in domestic rules allowing for foreign talents, they are outside of the WTO
framework and are rarely addressed in FTAs.206 ASEAN’s “à la carte”
approach to profession-specific harmonization efforts signifies the
implementation of regional law through a horizontal soft-law approach.
Unlike what the titles may suggest, MRAs do not accord direct recognition
of licenses and certifications.207 Instead, they provide a scheme of
cooperation based on member states’ respective agreements that harmonize
the divergence of national legislation regulating various professions.208
The effectiveness of MRAs is critical to ASEAN’s single market and its
attractiveness for global professional firms. Although the AEC Blueprint
2015 mandates that MRAs for all professional services be finalized by 2015,
ASEAN has so far concluded MRAs for only eight professions.209 The MRA
“frameworks” on accountancy services and surveying services focus on
identifying major principles and facilitating information exchanges.210 Their
purpose is to build consensus for fully fledged MRAs that govern highly
regulated professions in diverse jurisdictions. For the other six professions,
the implementation approaches vary across MRAs. The MRAs on nursing
202 The term “temporary” is negatively defined in the Agreement, based the model of the GATS Annex
on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services. See also Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190,
at 276 (discussing the GATS approach).
203 ASEAN MNP Agreement, supra note 166, at art. 2:2.
204 Id. at art 2:3.
205 ASEAN 2030, supra note 141, at 163.
206 GATS only include loose requirements for mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) in Article
VII.
207 Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), at 20–21.
208 AFAS, supra note 157, at art. V.
209 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26;
ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 33.
210 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement Framework on
Accountancy Services (2009), art. 1; Chia Siow Yue, Free Flow of Skilled Labour in ASEAN, in ASEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 107, 118–19 (Sanchita Basu Das
ed., 2013).
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services, medical practitioners, and dental practitioners require a relatively
simple process. Following certification by his or her country of origin, a
medical doctor with sufficient qualification and without ethics violations
may register as a foreign medical practitioner in the host country.211
As “the most visible” MRAs, the agreements on engineering services
and architectural services created regional bodies.212 Under the regional
public–private partnership, the ASEAN-level professional institutions and
national regulatory bodies have established a three-step registration process.
For example, an engineer who meets the MRA’s educational and experience
requirements should be first certified by the domestic regulatory body, which
submits the application to the ASEAN committee.213 After approval as an
“ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” the engineer is eligible to apply
to be a foreign engineer in another ASEAN state.214
The most recent MRA on tourism professionals (MRA-TP) has
important implications for development because tourism services are closely
linked with GDP and employment in developing countries.215 Unique among
ASEAN MRAs, the MRA-TP governs “unregulated” professions because no
international standards exist for tourism services providers.216 The ASEAN
experience sheds light on the impact of the legalization of tourism
professionals. The MRA-TP will advance the regional tourism industry by
developing a common curriculum and competency standards for thirty-two
job titles, such as baker, laundry manager, and travel consultant.217 It will
211 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on
Medical Practitioners (2009), art. 3.1.
212 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 34. The MRAs on engineering services and
architectural services created the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer Coordinating Committee and
the ASEAN Architecture Council, respectively. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN MRA on
Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.1; Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Mutual Recognition
Arrangement on Architectural Services (2007), art. 3.1.
213 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.
214 Id.; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, ASEAN Trade in Services, in THE
ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 95, 104–05 (Sanchita Basu Das ed., 2013). As
of 2015, there are 1,252 engineers and 284 architects on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers
Register and ASEN Architect Register, respectively. ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at
34.
215 The revenues for the tourism sector contribute to 10% of Cambodia’s GDP and 10% of
employment in the Philippines. Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, Cambodia, Revision,
WT/TPR/S/253/Rev.1, Nov. 24, 2011, at 79; Report by the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, the
Philippines, Revision, WT/TPR/S/261/Rev.2, May 9, 2012, at 93.
216 Note that in some ASEAN countries, tour guides are subject to regulatory requirements and
therefore they are not covered under the MRA. Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Assessing the Progress of ASEAM
MRAs on Professional Services, ERIA DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2015), at 26.
217 A person who possesses a tourism certificate issued by a national agency in compliance with MRA
requirements can be recognized as a “Foreign Tourism Professional” in another ASEAN state. Ass’n of
Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Tourism Professionals,
arts. II-III; ASEAN MUTUAL RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENT ON TOURISM PROFESSIONALS (MRA) –
HANDBOOK (2013) [hereinafter MRA-TP Handbook], at 18.
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also create a Web-based database to assist registered tourism professionals
in seeking employment in the bloc.218
C. Regulatory Reform for the Post-2015 Agenda
The emergence of the NREO in the context of Third Regionalism
demonstrates how the rise of South–South FTAs deepens regional
cooperation. Having grasped the reality that the benefits of bargained
concessions outweigh those of SDT measures, developing countries in the
Asia–Pacific have switched to a neo-liberal approach to international
economic law. South-based regionalism provides these countries with a safe
“playing ground” for trade liberalization. Moreover, the Doha Development
Agenda stresses aid for trade to help LDCs.219 The Bali package offers LDCs
additional waivers and preferential market access as a pro-development
policy.220 Ironically, these measures rarely necessitate domestic reform that
energizes development. The NREO approach provides a different path.
ASEAN-based regionalism has incentivized CLMV countries to pursue
market reform that resulted in noteworthy growth. As part of the bloc, these
LDCs benefit from the augmented negotiating power in extra-regional FTAs.
The AEC integration also prevents the negative consequence of trade
diversion.221
Built on the original AEC Blueprint, the creation of the AEC in 2015
prompted the adoption of the AEC Blueprint 2025 with the goal of further
transforming the bloc to a unified economy that is “highly integrated and
cohesive” and focuses on “sustainable economic development.”222 In
particular, services liberalization indicates ASEAN’s legalization of trade–
development policy in line with the SDGs. Nevertheless, it should be
cautioned that the AEC should be seen as an impetus for the evolving
process. To buttress the NREO argument for the benefits of the Global South,
I offer the following regulatory reform proposals in ASEAN’s post-2015
agenda.
1. Operationalizing Development Assistance
Operationalizing ASEAN’s development assistance is integral to the
services trade-oriented development policy and provides a model for Southcentered regionalism. The two-tiered ASEAN problem due to member states’
218

MRA-TP Handbook at 45–46.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO AT TWENTY: CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS
(2015), at 32–33.
220 Id.
221 See Cooper, supra note 75, at 11 (explaining the economic impact of the FTAs).
222 Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025
(2015), at 3, 19.
219
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economic divergences has posed formidable obstacles to the AEC’s goal of
realizing a single market and production base. As a form of development
assistance, the IAI work plans are intertwined with narrowing the
development gap and poverty reduction efforts.223 For instance, Singapore
offers training on IT and tourism through its centers in CLMV countries and
promotes the liberalization of these LDCs’ trade in services.224 However, the
effectiveness of fragmented IAI programs has been questionable.225
To offer WTO-plus development assistance, it is imperative to
consolidate multilateral harmonization and cooperation according to the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.226 Decreasing the transaction costs
of IAI programs and providing need-based advisory assistance will
strengthen the services trade-oriented strategy. An important approach is to
incorporate the principle of ASEAN centrality by aligning development aids
rendered by intra-regional and extra-regional countries. The integrated
measures will in turn achieve the SDGs’ objective of revitalizing global
partnership by fortifying “North-South, South-South and triangular
cooperation.”227
In truth, geopolitical considerations underpin respective countries’
official development assistance (ODA) policies, which are linked to the
implementation of FTAs and IAI efforts. Chinese foreign assistance enforces
Xi Jinping’s diplomatic priority over the periphery countries as an approach
to increase Beijing’s bargaining power to formulate the “new type of major
power relations” with Washington.228 The Chinese characteristics of South–
South cooperation have traditionally emphasized concessional loans for

223 ASEAN Integration Report 2015, supra note 156, at 80–81; Roadmap for an ASEAN Community:
2009-2015 (2009), at 96–106.
224 David Carpenter et al., Regional Development Cooperation and Narrowing the Development Gap
in ASEAN, in NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 135, 166
(Mark McGillivray & David Carpenter eds., 2013); About Us, SING. COOPERATION PROGRAMME,
https://www.scp.gov.sg/content/scp/about_us.html#what_we_do (last visited Aug. 13, 2017). Under the
Initiative for AESAN Integration (IAI), Singapore is the largest donor among ASEAN-6 countries. Id. at
164–65. Also note that IAI work plans focus primarily on soft infrastructure. Ass’n of Southeast Asian
Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Economic Community Factbook (2011), at 78.
225 Helen E.S. Nesadurai, Enhancing the Institutional Framework for AEC Implementation:
Designing Institutions that Are Effective and Politically Feasible, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 411, 421 (Sanchita Basu Das et al. eds., 2013); Vo Tri Thanh,
ASEAN Economic Community: Perspective from ASEAN’s Transitional Economies, in ROADMAP TO AN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 105, 116 (Denis Hew ed., 2005).
226 See GOLDIN & REINERT, supra note 147, 124 (indicating the Paris Declaration principles as
“ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability”).
227 Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goal 17.6.
228 Timothy
Heath, China’s Big Diplomacy Shift, DIPLOMAT, (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chinas-big-diplomacy-shift/; Dingding Chen, Defining a “New Type of
Major Power Relations,” DIPLOMAT, (Dec. 8, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-newtype-of-major-power-relations/.
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infrastructure building to facilitate the export of Chinese capital and labor.229
The private equity fund created under the ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
exemplify the practice.230
The training of foreign officials in China also demonstrates a new trend
of “soft” development assistance to export the Chinese development
model.231 Moreover, as the ASEAN–China FTA indicates, the geographic
hub of Chinese aid is the Mekong River basin, which covers CLMV countries
that are ideologically akin to China.232 The Chinese economic influence over
Cambodia is most noteworthy, as it prompted Phnom Penh to side with
Beijing in conflict with ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea
disputes.233
Similar to China’s focus on Southeast Asia, the Abe Doctrine of Japan
drove the country to be the largest external donor to the IAI programs.234
Whereas the Fukuda Doctrine built the foundation of ASEAN–Japan
relations in the 1970s, the Abe administration considers its ODA from the
national security viewpoint.235 The purpose of Tokyo’s assertive strategy is
to provide a counter balance to China and strengthen the United States–Japan
alliance, as well as consolidate Japanese enterprises’ regional supply chains.
The ASEAN–Japan FTA encompasses areas of economic cooperation in
terms of business environment, intellectual property, and small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs).236 Japan’s innovative development initiative
includes the technical assistance of drafting Myanmar’s Securities Exchange
Law, which facilitates the entrance of Japanese enterprises and law firms into
emerging markets.237
229 Information Office of the State Council of China, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, at 2–8,
(July 10, 2014).
230 China’s Foreign Assistance in Review: Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission Research Backgrounder (2011), at 13; Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank Articles of Agreement (2015), arts. 1–2.
231 Information Office of the State Council of China, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, at 4–5,
(July 10, 2014).
232 ASEAN-China Framework Agreement, supra note 132, art 7:1(e).
233 Cambodia’s pro-Beijing policy has impaired the common position of ASEAN on South China Sea
disputes. Kong Sothanarith, Cambodia Publicly Endorses China Position on South China Sea, VOICE OF
AM. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/cambodia-publicly-endorses-china-position-onsouth-china-sea/2694301.html.
234 Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160–64; Narushige Michishita, Shinzo Abe: Abe Doctrine to Remake
Japan-Asean Relations, STRAIT TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/shinzo-abe-abedoctrine-to-remake-japan-asean-relations.
235 For the origin and core principles of the Fukuda Doctrine, see SUEO SUDO, JAPAN’S ASEAN
POLICY: IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM 69–75 (2015).
236 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations
[ASEAN]–Japan, Apr. 18, 2008, art. 53.
237 NAM PAN, JAPANESE ODA TO ASIAN COUNTRIES: “AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MYANMAR
COMPARED WITH CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM,” 38 (2014).
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The conventional “North” also provides noteworthy development
assistance. Obama’s “pivot to Asia” policy and anti-terrorism strategy form
the basis of the ASEAN–United States Strategic Partnership, which
strengthens U.S. aid in trade facilitation, investment, and SMEs.238 To
expand ties with Asia, the EU also implements programs to enhance
ASEAN’s FTA negotiation capacity and the operations of the ASEAN
Secretariat.239 The United States and the EU are ASEAN’s dialogue partners,
but they have yet to conclude region-based FTAs with ASEAN.240 Among
ASEAN’s external FTAs, the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA has the
most detailed economic cooperation mechanism that directly contributes to
ASEAN’s integrated services market. Under the auspices of the FTA, the
ASEAN Qualifications Referencing Framework, which harmonizes legal
differences, advances the bloc’s Mode 4 liberalization and MRAs.241
Multilateral development assistance associated with the changing nature
of North–South relations benefits ASEAN in the multipolar economic
structure and affirms the NREO assumptions based on realism and the new
dependency theory. Nevertheless, countries’ “unilateral adoption” of IAI
projects, galvanized by divergent geopolitical goals, runs the risk of
undermining ASEAN’s integration and the IAI’s effectiveness. In practice,
leaders of projects from donor countries have conducted only informal
meetings for information exchange without substantive coordination to
reduce overlapping programs.242
To implement the Paris Declaration principles, ASEAN should
formalize development assistance coordination under the FTA framework.
Some may contend that the development chapter of the TPP will fill the gap
of coordination. I disagree with this contention. Although more ASEAN
countries are considering joining the TPP, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar
are unlikely to join the pact due to its high standards.243 The danger of being
“left out” for these LDC countries is counteractive to the AEC’s objective to
238 See generally The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S.
Strategic Partnership (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/21/
joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-partnership; Activity Fact Sheet: U.S.-ASEAN Connectivity through
Trade and Investment (ACTI) (2015).
239 EU-ASEAN: NATURAL PARTNERS, at 7–8 (7th ed. 2013); Carpenter, supra note 224, at 160–
62.
240 ASEAN’s dialogue partners include non-FTA partners such as the United States, Russia and the
EU. ASEAN Dialogue Coordinatorship, http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-dialoguecoordinatorship/.
241 Implementing Arrangement for the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Economic CoOperation Work Programme Pursuant to Chapter 12 (Economic Co-Operation) of the Agreement
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, ASEAN-Austl.-N.Z., Feb. 27, 2009.
242 EVALUATION OF EC CO-OPERATION WITH ASEAN, vol. 2, at 96–97 (2009).
243 As of December 2015, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand indicated their intentions to join
the TPP. Prashanth Parameswaran, Indonesia Wants to Join TPP: President Jokowi, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 27,
2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/indonesia-wants-to-join-tpp-jokowi/.
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narrow the development gap.
Importantly, the development needs of developing countries in the TPP,
such as Chile, Mexico, and Peru, are different from those of ASEAN. The
TPP may have a negative “development assistance diversion” effect on the
ASEAN states. Under Article 23, the TPP expects to establish a Committee
of Development to implement assistance programs.244 While such an FTA
design should be acknowledged, the TPP Committee lacks the institutional
memory concerning ASEAN IAI projects. Also, the TPP provisions address
neither a monitoring mechanism nor resource mobilization, which relates to
the fundamental question of “where money comes from.” The additional
ODA budget may further delay the ratification of the TPP in developed
countries.
The proposed NREO approach to development assistance is
distinguishable from the NIEO, which demanded overall redistributive
justice in international economic law without taking the North–South
political reality into account. The NREO proposes to translate fragmented,
geopolitical, interest-motivated development assistance projects into an
integrated, law-based mechanism centered on the South. To operationalize
development provisions under the mandate of the ASEAN Blueprint 2025,
effective coordination of development assistance should be integrated into
the implementation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the prospective RCEP.245 It is
for the ASEAN Secretariat to formalize the consultative mechanism between
ASEAN states and foreign donor countries.
To accurately address the needs of CLMV countries, the Secretariat is
advised to enforce monitoring and evaluation of development assistance
projects.246 Based on lessons learned from the WTO Enhanced Integrated
Framework for Aid for Trade, a trust fund coming from the existing budget
of ASEAN partners can be created.247 The fund would ensure the
independence of projects and enhance the ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity to
mobilize resources by aligning IAI work plans with AEC goals and the
SDGs. These mechanisms would provide a new catalyst for operationalizing
development assistance under the FTA architecture.

244

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 128, art. 23.7.
The scope of my proposal is larger than that of proposal for the Initiative for East Asian Integration.
Vo Tri Thanh, Effectiveness of Initiative for ASEAN Integration, in ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 183, 200 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013); ASEAN
Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 34-25 (2015).
246 FTA provisions should transform current ASEAN guidelines that “encourage” monitoring and
evaluation to a binding nature. Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] GUIDELINES FOR IAI
PROJECTS: FOR ASEAN DIALOGUE PARTNERS AND EXTERNAL PARTIES, at Sec. III (2013); ASEAN
Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 37 (2015).
247 For the introduction to the WTO Enhanced Integrated Framework and its predecessor, the
Integrated Framework, see WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO AT TWENTY: CHALLENGES AND
ACHIEVEMENTS (2015), at 74.
245
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2. Removing Regulatory Trade Barriers
Effective development assistance will positively impact services tradeoriented development and benefit the SDGs to end poverty, promote
economic growth and employment, and reduce the inequality among
nations.248 Nonetheless, a prerequisite to this projection is regionalismpromoted reform that removes regulatory trade barriers in domestic law. In
other words, services commitments under FTAs work for development if
they are based on de jure and de facto implementation. To provide a model
for South–South FTAs, ASEAN states should undergo further reform on the
negotiation modality and domestic regulations.
The structural improvements to ASEAN’s liberalization of trade in
services need to be prioritized in its post-2015 agenda. First, the immediate
priority is to enact the ATISA, which consolidates various services
commitments in general AFAS packages, sector-specific packages, and the
ASEAN MNP Agreement.249 The incremental liberalization approach is at
the point where a single schedule of commitments would further
transparency and integration. The ATISA should also strengthen its linkage
with the ACIA’s Mode 3 commitments to prevent Mode 4 restrictions from
obstructing the commercial presence of ASEAN enterprises.250
Second, AFAS commitments have been negotiated under the positive
list modality. Switching the negotiation mode to the more aggressive
negative list approach would effectively cover newly developed services and
enhance transparency.251 This approach would also solidify intra-ASEAN
supply chains and avoid the TPP’s potential trade diversion effect, which
would undermine the AEC integration. Except for Singapore’s hybrid
approach to services commitments, ASEAN countries are in favor of the
positive list approach to retain their regulatory space to protect infant
industries.252 However, an inventive design is embedded in the Malaysia–
New Zealand FTA, which currently lists services commitments on a positive
248

See Sustainable Development Goals (2015), Goals 1, 8, & 10.
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, at 6 (2015).
250 See Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31 (explaining the risk of disconnections between
Modes 3 and 4 in ASEAN services commitments).
251 Christopher Findlay, Services Trade Liberalization in ASEAN, in ROADMAP TO AN ASEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 172, 186–87 (Denis Hew 2005); Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé, Services, in
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK, 235, 251–52 (JeanPierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds., 2011).
252 For example, Singapore followed the positive list approach in the Singapore-China FTA, but
adopted the negative list approach in the Singapore-Peru FTA. Trade Policy Review: Singapore, Report
by the Secretariat, Revision, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/267/Rev.1 (Oct. 18, 2012), at 56. Other ASEAN
states, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, scheduled their services commitments under FTAs predominantly
on a positive list basis. Trade Policy Review: Malaysia, Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc.
WT/TPR/S/292 (Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review, Malaysia], at 104; Trade Policy
Review: Indonesia, Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/278 (Mar. 6, 2013), at 84, 109–10.
249
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list basis.253 In the FTA, Malaysia agreed to “commence re-negotiation of the
specific commitments” if it concludes an agreement on a negative list with a
third country.254 This forward-looking MFN mechanism should be
multilateralized to the AEC and the RCEP to trigger progressive
liberalization.
Third, the AEC allows the ASEAN Minus X formula and the 15%
flexibility rule in services trade liberalization.255 These politically-oriented
principles were designed to abate domestic protectionism and to stimulate
initial liberalization under the South–South FTA. In reality, neither principle
is clear. The ASEAN Minus X formula has led to fragmented commitments
at different speeds. It is unclear whether a state can opt out of the
commitments to which it first agreed if it is unable to meet the commitments
in the implementation stage.256 Furthermore, no ASEAN agreements
elaborate principles governing the 15% flexibility proviso, thus making it
difficult to comprehend whether and how countries should schedule their
services commitments based on the rule. To maximize the pro-development
effect, it is pivotal to narrowly construe these SDT-like exceptions and base
the intra-regional Grand Bargain on objective criteria.
Lastly, the AEC’s single market depends on the further liberalization of
Modes 3 and 4. Different from the EU’s top-down approach, ASEAN’s FTAplus path provides an optional model for the South. The salient issue for
commercial presence negotiations is the AEC’s 70% ASEAN equity
participation rule.257 While some member states have unilaterally increased
the foreign equity threshold to 100%, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
have yet to meet the AEC target.258 A priority for AFAS negotiations is to
minimize limitations of market access and national treatment for Mode 3, so
that domestic regulation will not cripple the effectiveness of ASEAN equity
commitments.259
The Mode 4 liberalization that facilitates cross-border labor mobility
has great potential for development due to the effect of remittances and skill
transfer. At the WTO, most Mode 4 horizontal commitments are related to
253

Trade Policy Review, Malaysia, supra note 252, at 32, 104.
See New Zealand – Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.-Malay., Oct. 26, 2009, art. 8.15(2) (“The
re-negotiation shall proceed on a ‘negative list’ basis. The Parties shall endeavour to conclude the renegotiation on the specific commitments within 18 months from the date the negotiations commence.”).
255 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015, at 26 (2009).
256 SEVERINO, supra note 111, at 352–53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 174, at 59–60.
257 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26. Note that the AEC Blueprint only
mandates “[n]o restrictions for Modes 1 and 2.” Id.
258 SIRISENA DAHANAYAKE, IMPLICATIONS OF LIBERALIZING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: LEGAL,
ACCOUNTANCY, AND ENGINEERING SERVICES IN LAO PDR, at 12 (2012); Dionisius Narjoko, AEC
Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: Services Liberalization, ERIA DISCUSSION
PAPER SERIES, at 14 (2015).
259 PHILIPPA DEE, DOES AFAS HAVE BITE? COMPARING COMMITMENTS WITH ACTUAL PRACTICE,,
at 21 (2013).
254
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intra-corporate transferees and business visitors, and labor mobility is thus
intertwined with commercial presence.260 Delinking the Mode 4
commitments under the ASEAN MNP Agreement with Mode 3 would create
more opportunities for independent professionals.261 Another required
improvement lies in ASEAN states’ commitments regarding the periods of
stay for natural persons under the agreement, which should be substantially
GATS-plus.262
The implicit interlocked mechanism between ASEAN intra-regional
and extra-regional FTAs has prompted states to use a higher threshold for
negotiations, thus making these FTAs “living” documents and ensuring the
AEC’s integration and its impact on Asia-Pacific regionalism.263 The
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, which contains a separate chapter on
the MNP, has the strongest GATS-plus services commitments among the
ASEAN+1 FTAs.264 The inclusion of the MNP annex in the recent ASEAN–
India Agreement on Trade in Services also indicates the direction of the
RCEP towards labor mobility.265 The enhanced liberalization of Modes 3 and
4 will strengthen ASEAN’s strategy of services trade-oriented development.
3. Transnational Legal Harmonization and Human Rights
Protection
Given the crisis of the Doha Round when it came to realizing the
development promises, the creation of the AEC illustrates an NREO
approach to South–South cooperation and offers an alternative for trade-led
260 64.1% of Mode 4 entries in GATS schedules are related to intra-corporate transferees and business
visitors. Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 21. The Mode 4 commitments under
the ASEAN MNP Agreement follow the same trend. Sarah Huelser & Adam Heal, Moving Freely?
Labour Mobility in ASEAN, ASIA PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE POLICY BRIEF,
No. 40, at 4 (2014); Flavia Jurie & Sandra Lavenex, ASEAN Economic Community: What Model for
Labour Mobility? NCCR TRADE POLICY WORKING PAPER, No. 2015/02, at 4 (2015).
261 In comparison, the TPP mandates that the cross-border supply of a service not be conditioned on
“a representative office or any form of enterprise.” The Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S.-Japan-Austl.Brunei-Can.-Chile-Malay.-Mex.-N.Z.-Peru-Sing.-Viet., Feb. 4, 2016, art. 10.6.
262 Under the GATS, “while business visitors are generally allowed to stay up to 90 days, the presence
of intra-corporate transferees . . . tends to be limited to periods of between two and five years.” Presence
of Natural Persons (Mode 4), supra note 165, at 1, 28. In ASEAN, business visitors are allowed to stay in
the host country from 30 to 90 days and the duration of stay for intra-corporate transferees ranges between
one month and three years. Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 8–9.
263 This approach reflects the practice of AFAS and ASEAN+1 services negotiations.
264 Razeen Sally, ASEAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional and Global
Integration, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS, 320, 363 (Sanchita Basu
Das et al. eds., 2013); Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area,
ASEAN-Austl.-N.Z., Feb. 27, 2009, Ch. 9. Note that the ASEAN-Japan FTA lacks services commitments.
265 Agreement on Trade in Services Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, ASEANIndia, Nov. 13, 2014, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons.
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development. In ASEAN’s post-2015 agenda, the bloc should streamline
WTO-plus matters with FTA policy. To maximize the development effect,
ASEAN should promote the regional legal harmonization of mutual
recognition and immigration rules and the legalization of human rights based
on international labor law. This approach will hence extend the
implementation of the SDGs from trade-led economic benefits to the
protection of labor rights and fundamental freedoms.266
ASEAN’s skilled labor-focused policy is applied through Mode 4
commitments and MRAs. Falling short of the AEC goal to finalize MRAs
for all professional services by 2015, the eight current MRAs cover less than
2% of ASEAN’s workforce.267 In practice, the MRA provisions that mandate
minimum years of experience have restricted the number of eligible
professionals.268 Even meeting the MRA criteria does not guarantee
employment due to states’ additional requirements. Consequently, there is a
gap between regional harmonization and domestic law.
A common obstacle is the labor market test. For instance, a Malaysian
company seeking to recruit a foreign engineer bears the burden of proving
the absence of local engineers for the specific project.269 Limitations on
nationality, residency restrictions, and language requirements pose additional
challenges.270 While Thai law accepts foreign nurses, none have been
admitted because the licensing examination is conducted in Thai.271
Arguably, the implementation problem also exists in bilateral FTAs. Japan’s
FTAs with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam accept ASEAN nurses.272
The statistics show that only three ASEAN nurses passed Japan’s nursing
examination in 2015, which is necessary for long-term residence.273 These de
266

E.g., Sustainable Development Goals (2015), supra note 4, Goals 8.5, 8.8, and 16.10.
Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 26; Guntur Sugiyarto & Dovelyn
Rannveig Agunias, A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and
Challenges in 2015 and Beyond, IOM-MPI Issues in Brief, No. 11 (2014), at 1. See ASEAN Economic
Community Blueprint 2025 (2015), at 11 (ASEAN should “[e]xpand and deepen commitments under the
ASEAN Agreement on MNP where appropriate . . . .”).
268 The required length of experience ranges from three to ten years. Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note
267, at 3.
269 Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130. The Philippines also imposes the labor
market test requirement for foreign nationals in its Labor Code. Rafaelita M. Aldaba, ASEAN Economic
Community 2015: Labor Mobility and Mutual Recognition Arrangements on Professional Services,
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 2013-04 (2013), at 4–5.
270 See Aldaba, supra note 269, at 3–4 (explaining that the Philippines’ Constitutional and the Foreign
Investment Act requirements); Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 214, at 130 (stating that a foreign
architect must reside in Malaysia for 180 days in a year).
271 Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 20–21.
272 See Ch. 3: Movement of Natural Persons 775–81, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/
downloadfiles/2010WTO/3-3Movement.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2015), (comparing Mode 4 commitments
in Japan’s FTAs with seven Southeast Asian countries).
273 The Results of the National Nursing Exam for EPA-based Nurse Candidates (Past Seven Years),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-10805000-Iseikyoku-Kangoka/0000079084.pdf
(in
267
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jure and de facto restrictions constrain the development potential for regional
labor mobility.
Mutual recognition is among the most difficult FTA issues. Even the
US-led TPP simply follows the GATS model by encouraging a member state
to “afford adequate opportunity to another” partner for negotiating an MRA,
which should be conducted in a non-discriminatory manner.274 In contrast
with the TPP’s nascent stage of development, the AEC framework has
accumulated ten years of experience in implementing regional MRAs.275
ASEAN MRAs possess the potential to provide a model for South–South
FTAs that energize mutual recognition schemes in Asia–Pacific FTAs such
as the RCEP and the FTAAP, which cover countries at diverse stages of
development.
To remedy the current weaknesses, ASEAN countries should intensify
the legal harmonization of domestic rules. Based on common criteria, states
should narrowly apply the MRAs’ “subject to domestic laws and regulations”
provisions and enlarge the right of independent practice for professionals.276
To ensure regional integration, states are obliged to increase the distinction
between ASEAN and other foreign professionals by according the former
more preferential treatment.277
The legal harmonization process that will prompt the paradigm shift in
Asia–Pacific regionalism is expected to link immigration rules to Mode 4
commitments and MRAs. The schemes under the EU and the Trans-Tasman
Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand allow freedom of
movement for work purposes.278 The development gap and concerns of
illegal immigration make visa-free mechanisms infeasible for ASEAN.
Significantly, 19 APEC members, including seven ASEAN states, participate
in the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC) scheme, which permits precleared business travelers short-term entry.279 The three-year valid ABTC
also allows holders to use the express APEC lane at ports of entry, thus
Japanese) (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
274 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 128, at art. 10.9; General Agreement on Trade
in Services (1994), supra note 164, at art. VII.
275 The first ASEAN MRA, which governs on Engineering Services, was concluded in 2005. See also
ASEAN Services Integration Report (2015), supra note 32, at 34 (“To date, there are a total of 1,252
engineers on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register . . . .”).
276 E.g., ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Nursing Services (2006), arts. 3.2; ASEAN
MRA on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3.3. See Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 16 (stating that unlike
the EU, “[t]he ASEAN MRA in principle does not give a right for independent practice. Actually, Vietnam
is the only ASEAN country that allows independent practice.”).
277 See Fukunaga, supra note 216, at 21 (observing that most ASEAN states “do not distinguish
ASEAN and non-ASEAN in their respective regulatory frameworks”).
278 For the introduction to the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, see ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
INSTITUTE, LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT MOBILITY IN ASIA 37 (2014).
279 Among the 21 APEC economies, only Canada and the United States are transitional members and
have not yet joined the scheme. APEC Business Travel Card, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/AboutAPEC/Business-Resources/APEC-Business-Travel-Card.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).

365

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

9/18/17 12:41 PM

37:321 (2017)

cutting time spent at immigration checkpoints by 52.4%.280
While the transplantation of the APEC-like “ASEAN lane” at customs
will improve labor mobility, the region can benefit more from a visa system
that extends beyond a temporary stay for business visitors. The AEC’s
implementation of facilitating “the issuance of visas and employment passes
for ASEAN professionals” can be modeled after NAFTA and the U.S. FTA
with Singapore.281 The “Trade NAFTA” visa (known as the TN visa) for
Canadians and Mexicans ties U.S. employment with renewable visas.282 The
United States–Singapore FTA created separate quotas for US H-1B work
visas allocated to Singaporean nationals.283 Based on these models, it is
recommended that ASEAN design a pan-ASEAN professional visa scheme
that allocates the visa quotes subject to negotiations. The scheme would
harmonize domestic immigration rules and deepen the implementation of
Mode 4 commitments and MRAs.
Other than the legal harmonization efforts, ASEAN’s breakthrough in
Asia–Pacific FTAs lies in facilitating and managing the flow of migrant
workers in the post-2015 agenda. The AEC has liberalized the movement of
professionals. The legitimacy of the services trade-oriented development
policy requires the expansion of “beneficiaries” of the regional integration
by incorporating low-skilled labor. As in other regions, a political paradox
has often arisen from the struggle between resistance to migrant workers and
the shortage of labor undertaking the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and demanding)
jobs necessary for economic development.284
From a legal perspective, the ASEAN Charter that legalizes the AEC
does not exclude low-skilled labor from ASEAN’s single market.285 The
current skilled labor-centered scheme is not sustainable because it ignores
the reality that more than 87% of intra-ASEAN workers are semi-skilled or
unskilled.286 More fundamentally, facilitating the temporary movement of
migrant workers will yield “the greatest absolute and poverty-related gains

280 APEC’s Achievements in Trade Facilitation in 2007-2010: Final Assessment of the Second Trade
Facilitation Action (TFAP II) (2012), at 1.
281 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 29.
282 See Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at 281 (“When proof of a job offer is demonstrated,
the TN visa permits employment for one year, with unlimited renewal.”); Philip Martin & Manolo Abella,
supra note 194, at 13 (“There has never been a quota on the number of TN visas available for Canadian,
but there was a 5,500 a year quota on TN visas available for Mexicans between 1994 and 2005.”).
283See USTR on Professional Workers in Chile, Singapore FTAs, July 23, 2003,
http://singapore.usembassy.gov/072303a.html (stating that under the FTA, the number of Singaporean
professionals in the United States is limited to 5,400).
284 See Jason Ng, Richer Asean Nations Resist Opening Doors to Migrant Workers, WALL STREET J.,
Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323646604578402283145126480
(discussing the situations in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand).
285 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007), art. 1:5.
286 Sugiyarto & Agunias, supra note 267, at 4.
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for developing countries” and reduce ASEAN’s development gap.287 Given
the estimated increase of low-skilled occupations by 62.4% and the urgent
labor shortage problem, it is timely to construct a mechanism to manage the
flow of migrant workers based on the best practices of FTAs.288
Markedly, the human rights dimension of the SDGs can also be
implemented through the labor rights protection under the AEC framework.
As merely 17% of GATS entries encompass low-skilled workers, ASEAN’s
WTO-plus mechanism will provide a new trade–development paradigm.289
Labor commitments are stressed in the IAI, the ASEAN Declaration on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, and the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration.290 However, the economic aim and human rights
aspirations are disconnected. Although the two declarations identify the
obligations of states, their soft-law nature and the absence of an enforcement
mechanism limit their practical value.
As an effective approach to labor protection, ASEAN countries have
concluded bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) or memoranda of
understanding that incorporate paramount principles of International Labour
Organization (ILO) conventions.291 Presumably, the BLAs that provide for
the movement of low-skilled labor have circumvented the MFN effect of the
GATS and led to a different type of “noodle bowl” effect.292 Some may argue
that domestic labor law enforcement suffices to achieve the goal of
facilitating the movement of labor. This argument neglects the practice of
excluding certain categories of labor, such as domestic maids, from
employment legislation and the work injury compensation scheme.293
287

Abrenica, supra note 144, at 354; Feeny & McGillivray, supra note 188, at 117.
Laura Brewer, LABOUR MOBILITY AND SKILLS RECOGNITION: LESSONS FOR ASEAN, PowerPoint
Slides (2014), at 6; Fukunaga & Ishido, supra note 199, at 31; LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), supra note 278, at 42.
289 See Arti Grover Goswami & Sebastián Sáez, How Well Have Trade Agreements Facilitated
Temporary Mobility, in LET WORKERS MOVE: USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE
TRADE IN SERVICES 17, 25 (Sebastián Sáez ed., 2013) (explaining the scope of Mode 4 commitments
under the GATS).
290 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community: 2009-2015 (2009), at 107; ASEAN Declaration on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007); ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
(2012), para. 27.
291 E.g., Memorandum of Understanding between Trade Unions in Cambodia and Trade Unions in
Thailand on Protection of Migrant Workers’ Rights (2013); LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), supra note 278, at 43.
292 The feature of Asian noodle bowl or spaghetti bowl commonly refers to fragmented rules of origin
under FTAs. For an analysis if the bilateral labor agreements’ potential violation of the most-favorednation clause of the GATS, see Arti Grover Goswami et al., When and Why Should Bilateral Labor
Agreements be Used, in LET WORKERS MOVE: USING BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS TO INCREASE
TRADE IN SERVICES 39, 45–46 (Sebastián Sáez ed., 2013); Stephenson & Hufbauer, supra note 190, at
290.
293 For instance, “domestic workers” are excluded from Singapore’s Employment Act and the Work
Injury Compensation Act. Employment Act (Ch. 91), art. 2(1) (Singapore); Work Injury Compensation
Act (Ch. 354), Fourth Schedule: Classes of Persons Not Covered (Singapore).
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Despite domestic courts’ recognition of “a matter of public interest,” the
vulnerable status of foreign workers has contributed to prevalent incidents of
labor abuses in the region.294
While it is not unique for South–South FTAs to include labor
cooperation, the challenge is to make such cooperation operative by
balancing economic need and human rights protection.295 ASEAN can
demonstrate the best practices for the NREO approach by incorporating labor
commitments into the multilateral AEC and RCEP frameworks. Richer
ASEAN countries’ resistance to labor provisions cannot stand, as they are
committed to the TPP’s labor protection modeled after U.S. FTAs.296
For development purposes, the AEC should oblige states to enforce
ASEAN Declarations in domestic laws. The 1998 ILO Declaration, based on
eight key conventions, requires states’ compliance with fundamental labor
principles.297 These principles, incorporated in ASEAN Declarations, include
freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition
of forced labor, child labor, and discrimination in employment.298
Nonetheless, only Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines ratified all of the
fundamental ILO conventions.299 The transformation of regional
commitments into domestic legislation will elevate human rights protection
and complement the overall development of the ASEAN Community.
Built on the best practices of the BLAs, multilateral labor cooperation
under the AEC is advised to strengthen the public–private partnership to
allocate visa quotas, streamline the recruitment process, and ensure the
embassies’ assistance in labor disputes.300 The integrated capacity building
294 E.g., ADG v. Public Prosecutor & Other Appeal, [2010] 1 SLR 874, 897, para. 55; see also Maid
to Order: Ending Abuses against Migrant Domestic Workers in Singapore, 17: 10(c) HUM. RTS. WATCH
1, 1 (2005) (“Between 1999 and 2005, at least 147 migrant domestic workers died from workplace
accidents or suicide, most by jumping or falling from residential buildings.”); Trinna Leong, ‘Forced
labor’ Rife in Malaysian Electronics Factories: Report, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-malaysia-labour-report-idUSKBN0HC08E20140917 (“One in five immigrants were working
more than the suggested 60 hours of overtime a week . . . .”).
295 E.g. Free Trade Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Chile, China-Chile, Nov. 18, 2005, art. 108.
296 These countries include Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia. For labor enforcement issues, see The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (2015), supra note 191, Ch. 19; MARY JANE BOLLE, OVERVIEW OF LABOR
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 4–6
(2014).
297 The Declaration requires all International Labour Organization (ILO) members, “even if they have
not ratified the Conventions in question,” to comply with four core labor principles. ILO, 1998 Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 1998), art. 2.
298 Id.; ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2007),
Obligations of Receiving States; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2012), paras. 3, 6, 27.
299 For ASEAN’s countries’ ratification status in the eight ILO conventions, see Martin & Abella,
supra note 194, at 28.
300 See generally Chanda, supra note 149, at 482–92; LABOR MIGRATION, SKILLS & STUDENT
MOBILITY IN ASIA (2014), at 43. This process also helps eliminate undocumented workers.
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and development assistance initiatives under FTAs that raise awareness of
labor rights are also integral to ASEAN’s legalization of trade–development
policy. These mechanisms not only reduce the transaction costs for regional
labor utilization, but also strengthen the trade–development connection in
line with the SDGs.
V. CONCLUSION
Trade–development discourse intertwined with North–South conflicts
has been at the core of multilateral trade negotiations and international
economic law. The SDGs of the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable
Development mandate the revitalization of development in the Doha Round
negotiations. Nevertheless, a misconception of SDTs has rendered the
WTO’s development promises unpromising. The crisis on the disconnection
between development goals and the Doha Round requires a feasible “Plan B”
for the Global South.
By reassessing the trade–development nexus, this article provides the
first analysis of an approach to accomplishing the SDGs through regional
integration. It argued that the NREO will fortify the coalition of developing
countries in expediting the legalization of trade–development policy. The
article thus moves the conventional debate to a new dimension on the
assertive role of developing countries and responds to an inquiry of the
paradigm shift in Asia–Pacific regionalism, with interrelated theoretical and
substantive claims. This article used the realist and dependency theories to
explain the geopolitical complexity of the NREO, built upon the rapidly
evolving South–South FTAs. While realism justified rare international
cooperation in the arenas of overlapping national interests, the new
dependency theory deciphered the transformation of neo-colonial economic
ties.
As a timely case study, this paper focused on the creation of the AEC
and its implications for global trade powers such as the United States, China,
and Japan. It examined the bloc’s incremental process of liberalization and
its balance of power strategy to alter the hub-and-spoke structure. The
proposed services trade-oriented development policy encompasses integral
components of intra-regional and extra-regional services commitments and
transnational schemes on labor mobility. The post-2015 agenda is advised to
center on the integration of development assistance and removal of domestic
barriers. Moreover, essential actions should include the transnational legal
harmonization of mutual recognition and immigration rules, as well as
linking the FTAs with human rights protection that incorporates international
labor principles. These structural movements would provide the best
practices for global regionalism and reinvigorate the trade–development
connection in the multilateral trading system.
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